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| Sorensen, Ann-Christin; Tennbakk, Berit. |
| We have employed a simple model to analyse market regulation in a situation with multifunctional agricultural production, i.e., a public good produced jointly with a private good, and where there is imperfect competition in processing. We have analysed the impact on welfare of two archetype regulatory institutions formed to overcome the market imperfections. The institutions, a Regulatory Marketing Board and a Regulatory Marketing Cooperative, are both represented in the Norwegian agricultural market. Taking into account the cost of public funds, we find that the Board in general ensures the highest social welfare. The Cooperative does not replicate the Board solution unless restricted by a price cap and in combination with a production subsidy. If the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Marketing board; Multifunctionality; Oligopsony; Trade; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24916 |
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| Tennbakk, Berit. |
| Over production is a persistent and costly problem in Norwegian agriculture. Support to agricultural production implicitly yields incentives to produce too much, i.e., causing market prices to fall below the target level, and thereby increasing the need for subsidies and additional market interventions. In order to restrict supplies, farmers are allowed to coordinate through marketing cooperatives. The paper argues that this coordination is likely to be insufficient in markets where the cooperative competes with an investor-owned wholesaler. Interventions in the market in order to remove excess supplies may induce further incentives to increase production. Levying a tax on all production in order to cover market regulation costs, moves the solution in the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Regulation; Over production; Duopoly; Agribusiness; Q13; L21; D43. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24907 |
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