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| Registros recuperados: 53 | |
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| Tsur, Yacov; Zemel, Amos. |
| Under risk of abrupt climate change, the occurrence hazard is added to the social discount rate. As a result, the social discount rate (i) increases and (ii) turns endogenous to the global warming policy. The second effect bears profound policy implications that are magnified by economic growth. In particular, we find that greenhouse gases (GHG) emission should be terminated at a finite time so that the ensuing occurrence risk will vanish in the long run. Due to the public bad nature of the catastrophic risk, the second effect is ignored in a competitive allocation and unregulated economic growth will give rise to excessive emissions. In fact, the GHG emission paths under the optimal and competitive growth regimes lie at the extreme ends of the range of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Abrupt climate change; Hazard rate; Discounting; Economic growth; Emission policy; H23; H41; O13; O40; Q54; Q58. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37944 |
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| Tsur, Yacov; Withagen, Cees. |
| We study optimal adaptation to climate change when the harmful consequences of global warming are associated with stochastic occurrence of abrupt changes. The adaptation policy entails the accumulation of a particular sort of capital that will eliminate or reduce the catastrophic damage of an abrupt climate change when (and if) it occurs. The occurrence date is uncertain. The policy problem involves balancing the tradeoffs between the (certain) investment cost prior to occurrence and the benefit (in reduced damage) that will be realized after the (uncertain) occurrence date. For stationary economies the optimal adaptation capital converges to a steady state. For growing economies the optimal adaptation capital stock approaches the maximal economic level... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate change; Adaptation; Hazard; Environmental Economics and Policy; O13; Q54. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117652 |
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| Tsur, Yacov. |
| The theory of stock uncertainty in the utilization of exhaustible resources is extended to renewable groundwater resources. A complete characterization of the exploitation process is presented, paying special attention to the formulation of the trasversality conditions. Exploration activities are incorporated and fit smoothly within the framework of analysis. Extensions to other renewable situations are outlined. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1992 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14208 |
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| Tsur, Yacov; Zemel, Amos. |
| We study the management of a natural resource that supports ecosystems as well as human needs. The reduction in the resource base poses a threat of occurrence of catastrophic ecological events, such as the sudden collapse of the natural habitat, that lead to severe loss of biodiversity. The event occurrence conditions involve uncertainty of various types, and the distinction among these types affects the optimal exploitation policies. When uncertainty is due to our ignorance of some aspects of the underlying ecology, the isolated equilibrium states characterizing optimal exploitation for many renewable resource problems become equilibrium intervals, giving rise to hysteresis phenomena. Events triggered by genuinely stochastic environmental conditions... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Ecosystem; Resource management; Event uncertainty; Biodiversity; Extinction; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14996 |
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| Tsur, Yacov. |
| We propose a simple and tractable procedure for evaluating producer welfare under price uncertainty. These properties are achieved at the cost of assuming constant absolute risk aversion, where risk attitude depends on the stock of wealth but not on the flow of income. Numerical examples corroborate the procedure's properties; the validity of the constant absolute risk aversion case as an approximation is discussed. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 1991 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/13624 |
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| Karp, Larry S.; Tsur, Yacov. |
| A constant social discount rate cannot reflect both a reasonable opportunity cost of public funds and an ethically defensible concern for generations in the distant future. We use a model of hyperbolic discounting that achieves both goals. We imbed this discounting model in a simple climate change model to calculate “constant equivalent discount rates” and plausible levels of expenditure to control climate change. We compare these results to discounting assumptions and policy recommendations in the Stern Review on Climate Change |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7192 |
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| Tsur, Yacov; Zemel, Amos. |
| The threat on the survival of animal species due to intensive use of natural resources is incorporated within resource management models, paying special attention to uncertainty regarding the conditions that lead to extinction. The manner in which the potential benefits forgone due to the species extinction (denoted extinction penalty) induce more conservative exploitation policies is studied in detail. When the extinction penalty is ignored, the optimal policy is to drive the resource stock to a particular equilibrium level from any initial state. When the extinction penalty is considered and the conditions that lead to extinction are not fully understood (i.e., involve uncertainty), an interval of equilibrium states is identified, which depends on the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1994 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7498 |
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| Smith, Rodney B.W.; Tsur, Yacov. |
| This paper uses mechanism design theory to (i) propose a mechanism to price irrigation water when farmers are heterogeneous in their production technologies (adverse selection) and their individual water uses are unobserved (moral hazard) and (ii) discusses briefly when such a mechanism might be economically unreasonable. Unmetered irrigation water is often priced by imposing per-acre fees on cultivated acreage or by charging per-unit fees on observable inputs or outputs. The offered pricing procedure is based on the observed output and achieves a first-best outcome when implementation is free of transaction costs. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14368 |
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| Parliament, Claudia; Tsur, Yacov; Zilberman, David. |
| Understanding the allocation of labor between collective and private activities within cooperatives has been an issue of interest for economists and policy makers. This paper extends existing literature by incorporating income uncertainty from both private and collective activities, and by assuming that members are risk averse. The analysis suggests a member's labor response to policy parameters can be decomposed into three components: the mean effect, reflecting the labor response under certainty or risk neutrality; the variance effect, reflecting the response to changes in risk; and the wealth effect, reflecting the response to changes in risk aversion associated with changes in wealth. The analysis demonstrates the labor response may be reversed from... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Labor and Human Capital. |
| Ano: 1986 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/13672 |
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| Registros recuperados: 53 | |
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