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| Uchida, Hirotsugu. |
| Individual transferable quotas system is widely regarded as the best fishery management regime. The literature, however, has ignored the consequence of this managerial system under the existence of market imperfection. This article analyzes the behavior of fishing households based on the household model when individual transferable quota system is introduced under missing labor market. It is shown that the individual transferable quotas system could adversely redistribute the quotas through quotas trade and thus cause social inefficiency. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22243 |
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| Uchida, Hirotsugu. |
| This paper presents an empirical analysis of the Japanese coastal fishery co-management system. In particular, the paper focuses on the effectiveness of Fishery Management Organizations (FMOs), which are established by groups of fishermen and set rules and regulations that they self-enforce. The paper finds that FMOs engaged actively in marketing practices in their output markets significantly increased their member fishermen's revenue. Proceeds sharing rules, where individual proceeds are pooled and shared among the members, appeared to have marginal effects despite of several anecdotal evidence that suggests otherwise. Findings suggest that benefit gains from the output markets is substantial in successful fishery co-management. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Fishery co-management; Marketing; Sharing rules; Japan; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19436 |
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| Uchida, Hirotsugu; Wilen, James E.. |
| Although comanagement is gaining increasing attention as a way to manage fisheries, few studies have attempted to understand quantitatively which factors of comanagement are critical for their success. This study investigates fishery comanagement regimes adopted by coastal fisheries in Japan. Utilizing a wide variety of examples of fishery comanagement nationwide, we search for key rules and measures that underlie traditional, cultural, and social aspects of comanagement. The study focuses on the rules of the game adopted by comanaging groups called fishery management organizations (FMOs). Upon examination of successful fishery comanagement cases, we found two distinctive measures: effort coordination and pooling arrangements. Furthermore, anecdotal... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9983 |
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