Sabiia Seb
PortuguêsEspañolEnglish
Embrapa
        Busca avançada

Botão Atualizar


Botão Atualizar

Ordenar por: 

RelevânciaAutorTítuloAnoImprime registros no formato resumido
Registros recuperados: 4
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Time is Money: Optimal Investment Delay in Procurement (and Concession) Contracts AgEcon
D'Alpaos, Chiara; Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola.
Procurement (and concession) contracts are agreements granting the right to construct public works, operate and provide a service/good. The main advantage of a procurement contract is that it passes full responsibility for investment and operations to the private sector and consequently provides incentives for efficiency. Although most contracts include penalty/premium clauses to avoid construction risks (i.e. delays), evidence from ongoing procurement contracts shows that there are many delays in making investments. Actually these clauses introduce the flexibility to decide when it is optimal to invest and consequently increase the contract’s value for the contractor. Therefore if the contracting authority underestimates penalty/premium fees, these may be...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Procurement/concession contracts; Premium/penalty fee; Investment timing flexibility; Public Economics; L33; H57; D81.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6642
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Restructuring Italian Utility Markets: Household Distributional Effects AgEcon
Miniaci, Raffaele; Scarpa, Carlo; Valbonesi, Paola.
Competition in public utility sectors has been encouraged in recent years throughout Europe. In this paper we try and analyse the welfare effects of these reforms in Italy, with particular attention to water and energy goods. The first step is to introduce a sensible measure of affordability of public utilities and to see how many households fall below a critical threshold. This issue is analysed stressing how climatic conditions dramatically affect households’ expenditure and how the affordability of utility bills varies a lot from region to region. So far, utilities’ reforms do not seem to have produced negative effects on the weaker group of households.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12114
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach AgEcon
Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola.
To avoid high profit levels often experienced in countries where monopolies in public utility sectors are regulated through price-cap mechanisms, several regulatory agencies have recently introduced profit-sharing (PS) clauses aimed at obtaining price reductions to the benefit of consumers. However, the implementation of these PS clauses has often turned out to be severely con- trained by the incompleteness of the price-cap itself and the non-verifiability of firms’profits. This paper studies the properties of a second-best optimal PS mechanism designed by the regulator to induce the regulated monopolist to divert part of its profits to custormers. In a dynamic model where a reg- ulated monopolist manages a long-term franchise contract and the regulator...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Financial Economics.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12202
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
"It Is Never too late": Optimal Penalty for Investment Delay in Public Procurement Contracts AgEcon
D'Alpaos, Chiara; Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola; Vergalli, Sergio.
We provide a general framework in which to determine the optimal penalty fee inducing the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do this by developing a real option model that enables us to investigate the contractor’s value of investment timing flexibility which the penalty rule - de facto - introduces. We then apply this setting in order to evaluate the range of penalty fees in the Italian legislation on PPCs. According to our calibration analysis, there is no evidence that the substantial delays recorded in the execution times of Italian PPCs are due to incorrectly set penalty fees. This result opens the way for other explanations of delays in Italian PPCs: specifically, we extend our model to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public Procurement Contracts; Penalty Fee; Investment Timing Flexibility; Contract Incompleteness; Enforceability of Rules; Financial Economics; L33; H57; D81.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54351
Registros recuperados: 4
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa
Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610
Política de Privacidade
Área restrita

Embrapa
Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n°
Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901
Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco

Valid HTML 4.01 Transitional