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| Velez, Maria Alejandra; Murphy, James J.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| This paper uses experimental data to test for a complementary relationship between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and nonbinding verbal agreements to do the same. Our experiments were conducted in the field in three regions of Colombia. Each group of five subjects played 10 rounds of an open access common pool resource game, and 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions communication alone, two external regulations that differed by the level of enforcement, and communication combined with each of the two regulations. Our results suggest that the hypothesis of a complementary relationship between communication and external regulation is supported for some combinations of regions and regulations, but... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Development; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14532 |
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| Velez, Maria Alejandra; Murphy, James J.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| With data from framed common pool resource experiments conducted with artisanal fishing communities in Colombia, we estimate a hierarchical linear model to investigate within-group and between-group variation in individual harvest strategies across several institutions. Our results suggest that communication serves to effectively coordinate individual strategies within groups, but that these coordinated strategies vary considerably across groups. In contrast, weakly enforced regulatory restrictions on individual harvests (as well as unregulated open access) produce significant variation in the individual strategies within groups, but these strategies are roughly replicated across groups so that there is little between-group variation. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14504 |
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| Velez, Maria Alejandra; Stranlund, John K.; Murphy, James J.. |
| This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of self-interest and other motivations such as altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and conformism. We test whether an econometric summary of subjects' strategies is consistent with one of these motivations using data from a series of common pool resource experiments conducted in three regions of Colombia. As expected, average extraction levels are less than that predicted by a model of pure self-interest, but are nevertheless sub-optimal. Moreover, we find that a model of conformism with monotonically increasing best response functions best describes average strategies. Our empirical... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14535 |
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