|
|
|
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A.. |
| This study investigates the influence of social preferences on voting decisions using a new Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is best thought of as a public goods voting extension of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshack mechanism for private goods. In particular, this mechanism is used to investigate experimentally whether voting decisions are affected by the distribution of net benefits associated with a proposed public program. Recent papers have shown that, in additional to selfishness, factors such as inequality aversion, maximin preferences, and efficiency may influence individual decisions. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism for public goods by legislatures and public referenda, has not been... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21145 |
| |
|
|
| Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A.. |
| Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D64; D72; H41. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51132 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Suter, Jordan F.; Poe, Gregory L.; Vossler, Christian A.. |
| The regulation of nonpoint source water pollution from agriculture is a complex problem characterized by a multiplicity of polluters, informational asymmetries, complex fate and transport processes, and stochastic environmental factors. Taken together, these characteristics make regulatory policy based on individual firm emissions prohibitively costly. To circumvent this issue, economists, beginning with the seminal work of Segerson (1988), have devised economic incentive instruments that assign liabilities based on deviations between the observed ambient water quality level and a specified pollution threshold (Xepapadeas 1991; Horan, Shortle and Abler 1998, 2002; Hansen 1998, 2002). In the special case of a linear damage function, the regulator can... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19411 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
