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VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTRACTING IN THE U.S. POULTRY SECTOR AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav.
This paper provides an economic explanation of the existing market organization of the poultry industry. The vertical integration and the emergence of contracts with independent farmers is explained by risk sharing, technological progress and innovation dissemination, consumer demand for product reputation and uniform quality, and access to capital. In addition, the sources of growers'’ discontent with existing contracts are analyzed and the potential need for government regulation is discussed.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Agribusiness.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/27819
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Do Farmers Value The Environment? Evidence from the Conservation Reserve Program Auctions AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav; Levy, Armando; Marra, Michele C..
The paper uses data from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auctions to elicit farmers' attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids. The CRP pays farmers to remove land from production and put it to a conservation use. An interesting aspect of these auctions is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots. The results indicate that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they consistently value those environmental improvements which are concentrated locally such as reduced soil erosion, while they place less emphasis on those benefits which resemble public goods such as air quality and wildlife habitat.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; D44; D82; Q51; Q58.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25233
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Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data AgEcon
Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav.
The objective of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for estimation of the parameters of a structural model of an incentive contract under moral hazard, taking into account agents heterogeneity in preferences. We show that allowing the principal to strategically distribute the production inputs across heterogenous agents as part of the contract design, the principal is able to change what appears to be a uniform contract into individualized contracts tailored to fit agents' preferences or characteristics. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we find that contracting farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agency Contracts; Optimal Incentives; Moral Hazard; Risk Aversion; Heterogeneity; Production Economics; D82; L24; Q12; K32; L51.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25568
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REGULATING BROILER CONTRACTS: TOURNAMENTS VERSUS FIXED PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AgEcon
Tsoulouhas, Theofanis; Vukina, Tomislav.
Grower discontent with tournaments as mechanisms for settling poultry contracts can largely be attributed to the group composition risk that tournaments impose on growers. This paper focuses on the welfare effects of a widely advocated regulatory proposal to prevent integrator companies from using tournaments and replace them with schemes that compare performance to a fixed standard. The analysis shows that whereas the mandatory replacement of tournaments with fixed performance standards, absent any other rules, can decrease grower income insurance without raising welfare, replacing tournaments with fixed performance standards can simultaneously increase income insurance and welfare, provided that the piece rate is correctly specified.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Industrial Organization; Livestock Production/Industries.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21833
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Homogenous and Heterogenous Contestants in Piece Rate Tournaments: Theory and Empirical Analysis AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav; Zheng, Xiaoyong.
In this paper we show that sorting different ability contestants in piece rate tournaments into more homogeneous groups alters incentives for agents to exert effort. In particular we show that for a given mean of the tournament group's ability parameters, larger variance (more heterogeneous agents) induces higher optimal effort. This implies that the principal can actually gain from heterogenizing the tournament groups. On the other hand, the effect of this change on growers' welfare is unclear because higher effort leads to higher productivity and hence higher payment, but also increases the cost of effort. Using broiler production contracts settlement data we empirically estimate a fully structural model of a piece rate tournament game with heterogeneous...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6540
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Optimal Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data AgEcon
Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav.
In this paper we develop an analytical framework for the estimation of the structural model parameters of an incentive contract under moral hazard with heterogeneous agents. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we confirm that contract farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across farmers. Assuming that contracts are optimal, we obtain estimates of a lower and an upper bound of agents' reservation utilities. We show that farmers with higher risk aversion have lower outside opportunities and hence lower reservation utilities.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Contracting; Heterogenous agents; Moral hazard; Livestock Production/Industries; Production Economics; D82; L24; Q12; K32; L51.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24645
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Transition to Markets and the Environment: Effects of the Change in the Composition of Manufacturing Output AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav; Beghin, John C.; Solakoglu, Ebru G..
The paper measures the changes in environmental quality that occurred in the early years of economic transition for 12 former centrally planned economies using information on 13 pollution effluents in the manufacturing sector and the energy intensity of the value added. For the manufacturing sector, the change in the pollution is separated into scale and composition effects. Pollution decreases substantially in most countries because of large decreases in aggregate manufacturing activity. The composition effect is more diverse depending on the effluent type and country. We examine the reduced form relationship between composition effects coupled with the energy intensity rate of change and the extent of policy reforms. The results indicate a strong...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18327
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Bargaining, Search, and Price Dispersion: Evidence from the Live Hogs Market AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav; Zheng, Xiaoyong.
Using unique panel data on individual transactions between buyers and sellers in the spot market for live hogs, we found a large degree of intra-day price dispersion. Motivated by this empirical puzzle, we offer an explanation which is rooted in the bargaining with search theory. We formulate three hypotheses involving the role of farmers’ search cost, bargaining parties’ patience, and asymmetric information that we believe can explain the observed phenomenon. Empirical analysis shows strong support for all three of the stated theoretical predictions, indicating that the bargaining with search theory explains at least 31 percent of the observed intra-day price variation in this market.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Intra-day price dispersion; Bargaining theory; Search cost; Asymmetric information; Demand and Price Analysis.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95603
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Quality Differences and Risk Shifting Associated with Alternative Marketing Arrangements in the Swine Industry AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav.
We analyze quality differences in market hogs across alternative procurement methods. The test results show that alternative marketing (procurement) channels generate hogs of statistically different quality. However, the quality ordering of alternative marketing arrangements is not unique, but varies across quality attributes, and the quality differences do not appear to be economically significant. We examine the relationship between alternative procurement methods for live hogs and the quality of the resulting pork products. The correlation coefficient between the non-spot market purchases of live hogs and the Hicks’ composite quality index for pork products is positive and significant, but the magnitude of that effect is small. Finally, we show that...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Livestock Production/Industries; Marketing.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55977
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Structural Estimation of Rank-Order Tournament Games with Private Information AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav; Zheng, Xiaoyong.
In this paper we propose a game-theoretic model of a rank-order tournament with private information and characterize its equilibrium solution. The model captures many important features of the production contracts once observed in the poultry industry. We use the contract settlement data from a poultry company who used rank-order tournaments to remunerate their contract growers and estimate a fully structural model of a symmetric Nash-equilibrium of this game. We show that growers' equilibrium effort depends on three factors: the spread in piece rates between the performance brackets, the number of players in each tournament, and the number of performance brackets used. We use the estimates of the productivity shocks density to simulate how changes in...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21059
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AN ADAPTIVE MODEL OF PERISHABLE INVENTORY DISSIPATION IN A NONSTATIONARY PRICE ENVIRONMENT AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav; Anderson, James L..
The paper develops an adaptive model of perishable commodity dissipation based on the individual's price expectations and risk perception. A two-step, state-space procedure for modeling nonstationary time series is presented. The method combines an impulse response model for estimating deterministic components with an innovations model for the remaining stationary stochastic noise. Combined parameters are used to generate forecasts and to derive a measure of risk in a nonstationary price environment. Defined as the variance (covariance) of out-of-sample forecast error, the measure of risk is the difference between the historical estimate of the stationary noise auto-covariance and the variance (covariance) of out-of-sample forecasts. The optimal...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis.
Ano: 1994 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31318
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Risk Sharing in Broiler Contracts: A Welfare Comparison of Payment Mechanisms AgEcon
Hegde, S. Aaron; Vukina, Tomislav.
Previous research has found that a significant part of risk from poultry grow-out farm operations is due to market price of broilers. This risk is transferred to the integrator when the grower enters a production contract with the integrator. This follows from the absence of a market price variable in determining compensation in such contracts. In more recent contracts a market price clause is included in calculating compensation. We conduct welfare comparison of the old and new contracts and find that while including the market price clause increases the variability of grower income, it also raises grower expected return. Overall, under assumptions of fixed flock size and constant percentage mortality, which enables payment per-pound comparison, new...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22171
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THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF HIKING: FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF OPPORTUNITY COST OF TIME IN RECREATIONAL DEMAND MODELS AgEcon
Casey, James F.; Vukina, Tomislav; Danielson, Leon E..
The paper tests two alternative specifications for the opportunity cost of time in travel cost models. The standard travel cost survey design is enriched to include a contingent valuation type question about peoples' willingness to accept compensation to forgo a precisely defined recreational experience. It is hypothesized that individually revealed value of time more appropriately reflects the opportunity costs of time associated with a particular aspect of recreation than the wage rate which measures the trade-off between work and leisure generally. The results seem to indicate a better overall fit for the models with the elicited value of individual consumer's time than for the models with the more traditional hourly earnings (wage rates). The...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Recreation demand; Travel cost model; Value of time; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 1995 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15282
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Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Short-term vs. Long-term Contracting in Animal Agriculture AgEcon
Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav.
The production contracts between integrator firms (principals) and independent growers (agents) in most agricultural settings are governed by short term contracts. Recently, some firms converted their short-term into long-term contracts. This change in contract duration represents a natural experiment that enables us to isolate the effect of the change in contract length from other changes in contract parameters on agents' incentives to perform. Using contract settlement data for the production of hatching eggs we show that switching from a short-term to a long-term contract alleviated the hold-up problem and resulted in increased investments in productivity enhancing technologies and practices which improved performance across all productivity margins.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agribusiness.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50046
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JOURNAL ARTICLE OF THE YEAR FOR 1994: AN ADAPTIVE MODEL OF PERISHABLE INVENTORY DISSIPATION IN A NONSTATIONARY PRICE ENVIRONMENT; ABSTRACT AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav; Anderson, James L..
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession.
Ano: 1995 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31601
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