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| Lauterbach, Beni; Yafeh, Yishay. |
| We follow the evolution of ownership structure in a sample of 80 Israeli companies that unified their dual-class shares in the 1990s, and compare it with a control sample of firms that maintained their dual share structure at least until 2000. Our main findings are as follows. First, controlling shareholders offset the dilution of voting rights they incurred upon unification by: 1) increasing their holdings prior to the unification (ex-ante preparation), and 2) by buying shares afterwards; by the end of the sample period their voting power was only marginally lower than in the control sample. This suggests that marginal voting rights are important to controlling shareholders even beyond the 50% threshold. Second, share unifications were not associated with... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Dual Class Shares; Corporate Governance; Financial Economics; G30; G32. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55833 |
