SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement.

Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information

Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Investment; Asymmetric information; Rational expectations; Choice of instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28.

Ano: 2002

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25071

Dynamic Water Regulation Under Endogenous Irrigation Investment and Production Uncertainty

Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms’ beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement.

Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation

Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Investment; Asymmetric information; Rational expectations; Choice of instruments; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42877

Regulation of Stock Externalities with Correlated Costs

Zhang, Jiangfeng.

We study the problem of regulating California agriculture water use. Regulatory decisions are conditioned on current information as well as the anticipation of future learning. Endogenous learning, either about damages from waterlogging or about abatement costs, affects the optimal control today. These regulations affect farmers' water usage and their incentives to adopt new irrigation technology.

Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation

Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2001

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20661

We study a dynamic regulation model where firms' actions contribute to a stock externality. The regulator and firms have asymmetric information about serially correlated abatement costs. With price-based policies such as taxes, or if firms trade quotas efficiently, the regulator learns about the evolution of both stock and costs. This ability to learn about costs is important in determining the ranking of taxes and quotas, and in determining the value of a feedback rather than an open-loop policy.

Bayesian Learning and the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Asymmetric information; Learning; Correlated costs; Choice of instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25077

We study the importance of anticipated learning - about both environmental damages and abatement costs - in determining the level and the method of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. We also compare active learning, passive learning, and parameter uncertainty without learning. Current beliefs about damages and abatement costs have an important effect on the optimal level of emissions, However, the optimal level of emissions is not sensitive either to the possibility of learning about damages. or to the type of learning (active or passive), Taxes dominate quotas, but by a small margin.

Managing Permit Markets to Stabilize Prices

Palavras-chave: Climate change; Uncertainty; Bayesian learning; Asymmetric information; Choice of instruments; Dynamic optimization; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Cll; C6l; D8; H2l; Q28.

Ano: 2001

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6214

Newell, Richard G.; Pizer, William A.; Zhang, Jiangfeng.

The political economy of environmental policy favors the use of quantity-based instruments over price-based instruments (e.g., tradable permits over green taxes), at least in the United States. With cost uncertainty, however, there are clear efficiency advantages to prices in many cases, especially for stock pollutants such as greenhouse gases. The question arises, therefore, of whether one can design flexible quantity policies that mimic the behavior of price policies, namely stable permit prices and abatement costs. We explore a number of "quantity-plus" policies that replicate the behavior of a price policy through rules that adjust the effective permit cap for unexpectedly low or high costs. They do so without necessitating any monetary exchanges...