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| Zhang, Mingxia; Sexton, Richard J.. |
| We investigate the optimal collection and expenditure of funds for agricultural commodity promotion in markets where the processing and distribution sectors may exhibit oligopoly and/or oligopsony power. The conditions that characterize optimal advertising intensity under perfect competition for funds generated from either per-unit or lump-sum taxes do not, in general, hold when marketing is imperfectly competitive. Simulation analyses show that imperfect competition always reduces farmers' optimal advertising expenditure and that an imperfectly competitive marketing sector may capture half or more of the benefits from the funds that are expended. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21823 |
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| Zhang, Mingxia; Sexton, Richard J.. |
| Exclusive contracts (often called "captive supplies") between processors and farmers are in increasingly important feature of modern agriculture. We study an interesting empirical regulatory occurring in markets that feature both contract and spot exchange: the spot price is inversely related to the incidence of contract use in the market. We use a spatial model and a noncooperative game approach to show that processors can use exclusive contracts to manipulate the spot price in certain situations. Captive supplies in these settings represent geographic buffers that reduce competition among processors. However, in markets where the spatial dimension is less important, captive supplies are ineffective as barriers to competition because firms have... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/30842 |
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| Zhang, Mingxia; Sexton, Richard J.; Alston, Julian M.. |
| This study investigates market conditions when food processor/handler brand advertising, whether undertaken by an investor-owned firm or by a cooperative, will benefit or harm farmers. Addressing this question provides insight into the policy issue of whether and when promotion funds intended to benefit farmers should be used in support of brand advertising. Analysis of a two-stage oligopoly-oligopsony model shows that advertising by an investor-owned firm is most likely to be harmful to farmers when it takes place in a relatively unconcentrated industry and when advertising is relatively more effective at creating brand market power than at increasing total demand. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31131 |
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