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REGALMIETEN UND DIE EFFIZIENZ VON ZULIEFERERVERTRAGEN (German) AgEcon
von Schlippenbach, Vanessa.
Als wesentlicher Intermediär zwischen Konsumgüterindustrie und Verbrauchern entscheidet der Einzelhandel mit seiner Sortimentsgestaltung über den Marktzugang von Konsumgütern. Damit verfügt der Einzelhandel über eine Flaschenhalsfunktion, die ihm zentrale Marktmacht gegenüber seinen Zulieferern verleiht. Diese Position ermöglicht es dem Einzelhandel, von seinen Zulieferern Gebühren für den Marktzugang zu verlangen. So wird zunehmend beobachtet, dass Hersteller Regalmieten oder Listungsgebühren zahlen, um ihr Gut über den Einzelhandel absetzen zu können. In einem Prinzipal-Agenten-Modell, in dem der Zulieferer weder die Nachfrage auf Endverbrauchermärkten noch die Bemühungen des Agenten beobachten kann, zeigen wir, dass Regalmieten die Effizienz vertikaler...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Listungsgebühren; Vertikale Verträge; Asymmetrische Information.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7609
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Regional asymmetries in farm size AgEcon
Huettel, Silke; Margarian, Anne; von Schlippenbach, Vanessa.
This paper explores how the initial farm size structure affects the exit decision of farms inducing free land capacities, and the allocation of the newly available land resources to the remaining farms in a particular region. We model an agricultural market where large and small firms first decide whether to leave the market or not; in case of continuing in production the farms compete for getting access to additional land resources in a Vickrey auction. We find that larger farms allocate more additional quantity than small farms; the latter are more likely to leave the market. An empirical illustration gives further support and reveals the relation between farm size structure, farm exits and growth of the large.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetries; Land market; Capacity allocation; Vickrey auction; Agricultural and Food Policy; Farm Management; Land Economics/Use; L11; L12; Q12.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/62046
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The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains AgEcon
von Schlippenbach, Vanessa; Teichmann, Isabel.
This paper highlights the strategic role retailers private quality standards play in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric downstream firms that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of upstream firms and letting the upstream firms decide which retailer to supply, we show that there exist two asymmetric equilibria in the downstream firms quality requirements. The asymmetry is driven by both an increase in the retailers buyer power and the retailers competition for suppliers. The use of private quality standards induces a decrease in social welfare, which can be softened by the implementation of a public minimum quality standard.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Private Quality Standards; Vertical Relations; Buyer Power; Food Supply Chain; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Industrial Organization.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114519
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The Strategic Use of Private Quality Standards in Food Supply Chains AgEcon
Teichmann, Isabel; von Schlippenbach, Vanessa.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agribusiness.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116079
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