Sabiia Seb
PortuguêsEspañolEnglish
Embrapa
        Busca avançada

Botão Atualizar


Botão Atualizar

Ordenar por: 

RelevânciaAutorTítuloAnoImprime registros no formato resumido
Registros recuperados: 3
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets AgEcon
Boutin, Xavier; Cestone, Giacinta; Fumagalli, Chiara; Pica, Giovanni; Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas.
This paper provides evidence that incumbents' access to group deep pockets has a negative impact on entry in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, the paper presents three major findings. First, consistent with theoretical predictions, the amount of financial resources owned by incumbent-affiliated groups has a negative impact on entry in a market. This suggests that internal capital markets operate within corporate groups and that they have a potential anti-competitive effect. Second, the impact on entry of group financial strength is more important in markets where access to external funding is likely to be more difficult. Third, the more active are internal capital markets, the more pronounced the effect on entry of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Business Groups; Cash Holdings; Internal Capital Markets; Deep-Pockets; Market Entry; Financial Economics; G32; G38; L41.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55829
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
A Simple Theory of Predation AgEcon
Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo.
We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale it needs, thus making monopoly profits on later buyers. Several extensions are considered, including markets where scale economies exist because of demand externalities or two-sided market effects, and where markets are characterised by common costs. Conditions under which predation may take place in actual cases are also discussed.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Anticompetitive Behaviour; Exclusion; Below-Cost Pricing; Antitrust; Financial Economics; K21; L12; L40.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59420
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion AgEcon
Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Ronde, Thomas.
This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Monopolization Practices; Vertical Agreements; Financial Economics; L12; L40; L42.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56213
Registros recuperados: 3
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa
Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610
Política de Privacidade
Área restrita

Embrapa
Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n°
Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901
Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco

Valid HTML 4.01 Transitional