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| Antoniou, Fabio; Hatzipanayotou, Panos; Koundouri, Phoebe. |
| We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting firms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their firm, however, governments are unable to perfectly foresee the actual level of demand, the cost of abatement and the damage caused from pollution. Under these modes of uncertainty we derive sufficient conditions under which the governments optimally choose an emissions tax over an emissions standard. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Strategic Environmental Policy; Pollution; Choice of Policy Instrument; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; F12; F18; Q58. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59375 |
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| Birol, Ekin; Karousakis, Katia; Koundouri, Phoebe. |
| Despite wetlands being amongst the Earths most productive ecosystems, they have been degraded and lost at an unprecedented rate globally, especially throughout the last century. In recognition of the importance of the crucial ecological functions and economic benefits they provide, international efforts, such as the Ramsar Convention, and European Union level efforts, such as the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), are now in place to ensure conservation, sustainable management and improvement of the remaining wetlands. This paper aims to assist policy makers in formulating efficient, effective and sustainable wetland conservation and management policies by providing them with the results of a valuation study using the Cheimaditida wetland in Greece... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Choice experiment; Non-use values; Wetlands; Conditional logit model; Random parameter logit model; Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31934 |
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| Antoniou, Fabio; Hatzipanayotou, Panos; Koundouri, Phoebe. |
| In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic effect is reversed and leads to a welfare level closer to the cooperative one and strictly higher to that when permits are non-tradable. Allowing for market power in the permits market, the incentive to under-regulate pollution re-appears regardless of whether permits are tradable or not. With tradable permits, however, the incentive to under-regulate pollution is comparatively... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Strategic Environmental Policy; Tradable Permits; Race to the top; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q58; F12; F18. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59374 |
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| Koundouri, Phoebe; Nauges, Celine. |
| In the estimation of production functions, ignoring risk considerations can cause inefficient estimates, while biased parameter estimates arise in the presence of sample selection. In the presence of uncertainty and selection bias, the latter introduced by the endogeneity of qualitative characteristics of inputs in crop choice, we show that correcting for risk considerations (a la Just and Pope, 1978, 1979) but not selection bias, can produce incorrect inferences in terms of risk behavior. The arguments raised in this study have estimation and policy implications for stochastic production analysis applied to all goods whose qualitative characteristics can affect sample selection. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Crop choice; Production risk; Sample selection; Production Economics. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/30977 |
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