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Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.. |
The combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means by which the earths fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of IEAs. As such, in this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of IEAs. Very generally, I propose that we frame the IEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International; Environmental; Agreement; Design; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; D73; D82; L50. |
Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28353 |
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Viju, Crina; Kerr, William A.; Mekkaoui, Cherine. |
Most observers agree that the major areas where gains can be made in CETA are in the services sector and selected areas of manufacturing. It seems unlikely that CETA will be as all encompassing as the NAFTA with only a few agricultural products excluded from full tariff elimination. Still, it sends a bad signal if some trade liberalization is not achieved in agriculture and with a long implementation period no reason not to make progress. The major gains in agriculture are likely to be in niche markets which taken individually are small but in aggregate could provide a boost to Canadian agriculture. Most importantly, a trade agreement with the potential to open a rich market with 500 million consumers to the wide range of products and services exported by... |
Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Canada; EU trade; Agreement; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95800 |
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Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.. |
I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but he must deal with such firms through their governments. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties of the optimal ex post contracts (IEAs), which can be implemented by the SNGA, in turn, in the case where governments and firms in each nation do not collude and then in the case where governments and firms do collude. I find that the monetary transfers necessary to induce optimal behavior by governments and firms are not very sensitive to the... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental; Agreement; LDCs; Budget; Ceiling; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Development; D62; D82; Q25. |
Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28347 |
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