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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (4) ArchiMer (1) Autor Franken, Jason R.V. (2) Garcia, Philip (2) Pennings, Joost M.E. (2) Hudson, Darren (1) Levrel, Harold (1) Pioch, Sylvain (1) Vaissiere, Anne-charlotte (1) Walls, Margaret (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Asset specificity (5) Contracts (2) Hogs (2) Risk behavior (2) Transaction costs economics (2) Agricultural Finance (1) Contracting (1) Ecological-economic viability (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Environmental uncertainty (1) Farm Management (1) Incentive contracts (1) L14 (1) L33 (1) Livestock Production/Industries (1) Principal-agent models (1) Q2 (1) Recycling (1) Risk and Uncertainty (1) Risk attitude (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Report (1) Text (1) Ano 2017 (1) 2009 (1) 2008 (1) 2003 (1) 2000 (1) País United States (4) France (1) Idioma Inglês (5)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Wetland mitigation banking: Negotiations with stakeholders in a zone of ecological-economic viability ArchiMer Vaissiere, Anne-charlotte; Levrel, Harold; Pioch, Sylvain. Wetland mitigation banking (WMB) is an organizational form that attempts to balance the ecological goals of wetland conservation and the economic goals of development with the aim of improving the implementation of wetland offsetting. Given the resulting tension, it is important to understand how the way stakeholders employ the WMB regulatory framework affects the goal of No Net Loss of wetlands. In this study, we interviewed WMB stakeholders in Florida in the United States to identify their strategies during negotiations around different aspects of defining wetland mitigation credits (e.g. service areas, types of credit and credit release schedules). Using the approach of New Institutional Economics, we found that within a framework of well-defined rules... Tipo: Text Palavras-chave: Wetland offsetting; Wetland mitigation banking; Asset specificity; Environmental uncertainty; Stakeholders' strategy; Ecological-economic viability. Ano: 2017 URL: http://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00405/51613/52308.pdf Do Transaction Costs and Risk Preferences Influence Marketing Arrangements in the Illinois Hog Industry? AgEcon Franken, Jason R.V.; Pennings, Joost M.E.; Garcia, Philip. Studies of hog industry structure often invoke risk reduction and transaction costs explanations for empirical observations but fail to directly examine the core concepts of risk behavior and transaction costs theories. Using a more unified conceptual framework and unique survey and accounting data, this study demonstrates that that risk preferences and asset specificity impact Illinois producers’ use of contracts and spot markets as suggested by theory. Factor analytic methods limit measurement error for indirectly observable risk and transaction costs variables employed in logit regressions. In particular, related investments in specific hog genetics and specific human capital regarding the production process increase the probability of selecting... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Risk behavior; Transaction costs economics; Risk attitude and risk perception; Asset specificity; Contracts; Hogs; Agricultural Finance. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37599 How Local Governments Structure Contracts with Private Firms: Economic Theory and Evidence on Solid Waste and Recycling Contracts AgEcon Walls, Margaret. Solid waste management services are contracted out to private firms in many U.S. communities. Household waste collection, transport, and disposal are relatively straightforward services to define within the terms of a contract. The addition of recycling, however, significantly complicates matters. How should contracts be structured to provide incentives for recycling? Who should own key facilities, such as recyclable materials processing facilities? Should a separate contract for processing and sale of materials be used, or should these services be provided by government employees or purely private markets? These questions are addressed in this study using the principal-agent framework and the theory of incomplete contracts in economics. I explain stylized... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Incentive contracts; Asset specificity; Principal-agent models; Waste collection; Recycling; Environmental Economics and Policy; L33; L14; Q2. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10707 Do Transaction Costs and Risk Preferences Influence Marketing Arrangements in the Illinois Hog Industry? AgEcon Franken, Jason R.V.; Pennings, Joost M.E.; Garcia, Philip. Risk reduction and transaction costs are often used to explain contracting in the U.S. hog industry with little empirical support. Using a unified conceptual framework that draws from risk behavior and transaction cost theories, in combination with unique survey and accounting data, we demonstrate that risk preferences and asset specificity impact Illinois producers’ use of contracts and spot markets. In particular, producers’ investments in specific hog genetics and human capital are related to selection of long-term marketing contracts over spot markets. Producers who perceive greater levels of price risk and/or are more averse are more (less) likely to use contracts (spot markets). Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Asset specificity; Contracts; Hogs; Risk attitude; Risk behavior; Risk perception; Transaction costs economics; Livestock Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54548 CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURE: A PRIMER FOR FARM LENDERS AgEcon Hudson, Darren. Contracting in agriculture has increased over the past several decades. This activity has heightened concerns about concentration, market power, and farmer welfare. The purpose of this paper is to describe some of the underlying motivations for contracting and to highlight some of the trade-offs made when making contracting decisions. These illustrations are intended to inform readers of the economic conditions for contracting, not provide empirical evidence of their implications, costs, or benefits. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Contracting; Asset specificity; Transaction costs; Farm Management. Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15789 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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