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| Registros recuperados: 48 | |
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| Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele. |
| We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits; Public Economics; L51; D44; D92. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50409 |
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| Lusk, Jayson L.. |
| The present article discusses general issues associated with experimental auctions and their relative advantages and disadvantages over other marketing research techniques. Experimental auctions create an active market environment with feedback where subjects exchange real goods and real money, which is not generally the case with other methods. The article also discusses four experimental design issues associated with experimental auctions: auction mechanism, market feedback and bidder affiliation, demand reduction and wealth effects, and multiple attribute valuation. Each of these experimental design issues, if not properly controlled, have the potential to create serious flaws in marketing recommendations. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Experimental economics; Marketing; Valuation; Willingness-to-pay; D44; C92; Q13; M31. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43210 |
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| Klonner, Stefan. |
| A bidding rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is modeled as a sequence of symmetric-independent-private-value auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders. We estimate a structural econometric model which, by introducing an altruistic component into each bidder's utility function, allows for socially favorable deviations from the private information, non-altruistic bidding equilibrium. We find that bidding is more altruistic in groups managed by experienced organizers and in Roscas whose current members have already run through more than one Rosca cycle of the current group, implying that effective leadership and enduring relationships help mitigate the social cost of strategic behavior. When a bidder has to meet an unforeseen... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Roscas; Auctions; Consumer/Household Economics; D44; G20. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28449 |
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| Schamel, Guenter. |
| We present a first analysis of auction markets for specialty food products. We identify auction prices, trade volume and value for domestic and foreign origin specialty ham with geographical indications (GIs) which were actually sold in online auctions in Germany within a one-month period. Applying hedonic modeling, we examine potential factors that may influence online bidding behavior and final auction prices. We estimate positive auction price effects for weight, bidding activity, and auction length, that the domestic product is sold at a discount, that higher shipping cost have a negative impact on final prices, and that auctions ending on Fridays and Saturdays yield lower prices. The model may be used to estimate the value of GIs. In our example, we... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Consumer economics; Geographical indications; Auctions; Information; Marketing; D12; D44; D83. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25606 |
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| Brümmer, Bernhard; Loy, Jens-Peter; Struve, Carsten. |
| In this paper the newly established rules for trading milk quotas in Germany are analyzed. These regulations have been in force since April 2000. Following a brief historical review of the quota system, the major changes in economic incentives regarding trading milk and the expected welfare implications are derived. Next, the effects of the new trading rules on quota prices in comparison to a reference system (sealed bid double auction) are discussed. In the empirical part the significance of the theoretical effects is illustrated. Recent changes in the regulations for quota trade are shown to have little effect in terms of mitigating these problems. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Rules for milk quota trading; Auctions; Agricultural and Food Policy; Financial Economics. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97978 |
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| MacDonald, James M.; Handy, Charles R.; Plato, Gerald E.. |
| USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) purchases food products for distribution through several of the Department's food assistance programs. This report describes FSA purchase methods and compares them to procurement strategies used by other Federal agencies and by private sector firms. It summarizes the principal policy issues faced by FSA in designing procurement strategies. And it uses a detailed statistical analysis to compare FSA prices to those realized in the private sector, and to identify the separate effects of agricultural commodity prices, seasonality, client location, purchase volumes, product characteristics, and competition on FSA product prices. |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Procurement; Auctions; Food assistance; Competition; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/33925 |
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| Rolfe, John; Windle, Jill. |
| Australian governments continue to commit significant resources to the protection of the Great Barrier Reef. Funding for the Reef Rescue Programme is focused on reducing the impact of agricultural production on water quality. Information about the costs and benefits of funding proposals is limited. As a result, the key challenge for policy makers is to identify where funding is most efficiently applied. While there is adequate information about the costs of various inputs for reducing water quality, the costs of achieving various outputs is much more limited. Water quality tenders show the opportunity costs of changing agricultural practices. They allow policy makers to better understand the potential costs of misallocating public resources. It also... |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Conservation tenders; Market based instruments; Water quality; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94884 |
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| Feinerman, Eli; Gardebroek, Cornelis. |
| In order to stimulate organic farming governments generally use a mix of temporary hectare payments and provision of public services for stimulating the development of the organic sector. In this paper a conceptual model is developed for determining a socially optimal hectare payment for any given level of public services. Farm heterogeneity, due to the variability of soil quality and management skills, is explicitly taken into account. Using an n-th price auction mechanism farmers indicate what their reservation subsidy is for a given level of public input provision. The outcome of this problem is utilized in the government's optimization problem. We found that the level of per hectare socially optimal subsidy increases significantly with the elasticity... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Organic farming; Policy mix; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q28; Q12. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24723 |
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| Registros recuperados: 48 | |
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