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| Registros recuperados: 48 | |
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| Schamel, Guenter. |
| We present a first analysis of auction markets for specialty food products. We identify auction prices, trade volume and value for domestic and foreign origin specialty ham with geographical indications (GIs) which were actually sold in online auctions in Germany within a one-month period. Applying hedonic modeling, we examine potential factors that may influence online bidding behavior and final auction prices. We estimate positive auction price effects for weight, bidding activity, and auction length, that the domestic product is sold at a discount, that higher shipping cost have a negative impact on final prices, and that auctions ending on Fridays and Saturdays yield lower prices. The model may be used to estimate the value of GIs. In our example, we... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Consumer economics; Geographical indications; Auctions; Information; Marketing; D12; D44; D83. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25606 |
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| White, Benedict; Burton, Michael P.. |
| The principle motivation for using price-discriminating conservation auctions is that they are expected to be significantly more cost-effective than fixed-price mechanisms. This paper measures cost effectiveness for tenders from two rounds of the Auction for Landscape Recovery in Western Australia relative to counterfactual fixed-price mechanisms. If we assume that the bid equals the compliance cost, the auction gives a significant cost saving over fixed-price mechanisms. If instead we assume that bids include an element of rent, fixed-price mechanisms can be more cost effective than the auction. The significance of these results is that a fixed price scheme may achieve a similar level of cost effectiveness to a conservation auction, when one or more... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Conservation; Bio-diversity; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q57. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97798 |
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| Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram. |
| In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96668 |
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| MacDonald, James M.; Handy, Charles R.; Plato, Gerald E.. |
| USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) purchases food products for distribution through several of the Department's food assistance programs. This report describes FSA purchase methods and compares them to procurement strategies used by other Federal agencies and by private sector firms. It summarizes the principal policy issues faced by FSA in designing procurement strategies. And it uses a detailed statistical analysis to compare FSA prices to those realized in the private sector, and to identify the separate effects of agricultural commodity prices, seasonality, client location, purchase volumes, product characteristics, and competition on FSA product prices. |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Procurement; Auctions; Food assistance; Competition; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/33925 |
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| Connor, Jeffery D.; Ward, John R.; Bryan, Brett. |
| This article evaluates the cost-effectiveness of the Catchment Care Australian conservation auction. It provides evidence of auction cost effectiveness, and estimates cost savings from two discrete components: (i) the opportunity cost revelation incentive provided by the auction mechanism, and (ii) the improved environmental targeting capacity that results from development of a scientifically based environmental benefits assessment capacity. Results show that there are potentially very large returns associated with the latter component that have been overlooked in the literature. Additionally, transaction costs involved with administering the case study conservation auction and the prior non-auction payment policy are compared. We find that the... |
| Tipo: Article |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Biodiversity; Cost effectiveness; Environmental economics; Environmental policy; Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118545 |
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| Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele. |
| We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits; Public Economics; L51; D44; D92. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50409 |
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| Rolfe, John; Windle, Jill. |
| Australian governments continue to commit significant resources to the protection of the Great Barrier Reef. Funding for the Reef Rescue Programme is focused on reducing the impact of agricultural production on water quality. Information about the costs and benefits of funding proposals is limited. As a result, the key challenge for policy makers is to identify where funding is most efficiently applied. While there is adequate information about the costs of various inputs for reducing water quality, the costs of achieving various outputs is much more limited. Water quality tenders show the opportunity costs of changing agricultural practices. They allow policy makers to better understand the potential costs of misallocating public resources. It also... |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Conservation tenders; Market based instruments; Water quality; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94884 |
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| Klonner, Stefan. |
| A bidding rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is modeled as a sequence of symmetric-independent-private-value auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders. We estimate a structural econometric model which, by introducing an altruistic component into each bidder's utility function, allows for socially favorable deviations from the private information, non-altruistic bidding equilibrium. We find that bidding is more altruistic in groups managed by experienced organizers and in Roscas whose current members have already run through more than one Rosca cycle of the current group, implying that effective leadership and enduring relationships help mitigate the social cost of strategic behavior. When a bidder has to meet an unforeseen... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Roscas; Auctions; Consumer/Household Economics; D44; G20. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28449 |
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| Registros recuperados: 48 | |
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