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| Dall'Asta, Luca; Pin, Paolo; Ramezanpour, Abolfazl. |
| We consider any network environment in which the “best shot game” is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A natural application of the model is one in which the action 1 is the purchase of a good, which is locally a public good, in the sense that it will be available also to neighbors. This game will typically exhibit a great multiplicity of equilibria. Imagine a social planner whose scope is to find an optimal equilibrium, i.e. one in which the number of nodes playing 1 is minimal. To find such an equilibrium is a very hard task for any non-trivial network architecture. We propose an implementable mechanism that, in the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Networks; Best Shot Game; Simulated Annealing; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C61; C63; D85; H41. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50684 |
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| Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo. |
| The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how we define perturbations, i.e. the possible mistakes that agents can make, we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable equilibria. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of an agent contributing that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable equilibria are those in which the maximal number of players contributes. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Networks; Best Shot Game; Stochastic Stability; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; C73; D85; H41. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96840 |
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