SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Meyer, Leandro Fredrico Ferraz; Braga, Marcelo Jose.

The paper presents experimental results connecting the participant’s behaviors in a common-pool resource dilemma, including communication and sanctioning conditions, with the constructs in a selected theory of adult personality systems development including value judgment and moral reasoning.

In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents

Palavras-chave: Commons dilemma; Experimental economics; Institutional analysis; Psychosocial development; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C92; D74.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51340

Ule, Aljaz; Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno.

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. Furthermore, agents' types may be common knowledge or private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. With homogeneous agents, equilibrium predictions fail completely. In contrast, with heterogeneous agents stars frequently occur, often with the high-value or low-cost agent in the center. Stars are not born but rather develop: with a high-value agent, the network's centrality, stability, and efficiency all...

The Optimal Climate Policy Portfolio when Knowledge Spills Across Sectors

Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Experiment; Heterogeneity; Private Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C92; D82; D85.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9099

Massetti, Emanuele; Nicita, Lea.

This paper studies the implications for climate policy of the interactions between environmental and knowledge externalities. Using a numerical analysis performed with the hybrid integrated assessment model WITCH, extended to include mutual spillovers between the energy and the non-energy sector, we show that the combination between environmental and knowledge externalities provides a strong rationale for implementing a portfolio of policies for both emissions reduction and the internalisation of knowledge externalities. Moreover, we show that implementing technology policy as a substitute for stabilisation policy is likely to increase global emissions.

Bilingualism and Communicative Benefits

Palavras-chave: Technical Change; Climate Change; Development; Innovation; Spillovers; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28; O31; O41; Q54.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92912

Gabszewicz, Jean; Ginsburgh, Victor; Weber, Shlomo.

We examine patterns of acquiring non-native languages in a model with two languages and two populations with heterogeneous learning skills, where every individual faces a binary choice of learning the foreign language or refraining from doing so. We show that both interior and corner linguistic equilibria can emerge in our framework, and that the fraction of learners of the foreign language is higher in the country with a higher gross cost adjusted communicative benefit. It turns out that this observation is consistent with the data on language proficiency in bilingual countries such as Belgium and Canada. We also point out that linguistic equilibria can exhibit insufficient learning which opens the door for government policies that are beneficial for both...

Networks with Group Counterproposals

Palavras-chave: Communicative Benefits; Linguistic Equilibrium; Learning Costs; Labor and Human Capital; C72; D83; O52; Z13.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6380

Nieva, Ricardo.

We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.

Delayed Action and Uncertain Targets. How Much Will Climate Policy Cost?

Palavras-chave: Efficiency; Bargaining Protocol; Counterproposals; Network Formation; Transfers; Externalities; Groups; Coalitions; C71; C72; C73; C78.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42901

Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Sgobbi, Alessandra; Tavoni, Massimo.

Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global stabilisation target to be...

Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network

Palavras-chave: Uncertainty; Climate Policy; Stabilisation Costs; Delayed Action; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44219

Richefort, Lionel; Point, Patrick.

A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France).

Team Formation in a Network

Palavras-chave: Common-pool Resource; Digraph; Cycle; Independent Set; Empirical Example; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; D85; H41.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98470

Kinateder, Markus.

Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent’s expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation. A social planner frequently would achieve a higher welfare.

River Sharing and Water Trade

Palavras-chave: Dynamic Competitive Group Formation; Imperfect Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C73; D85.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50722

Ansink, Erik; Gengenbach, Michael; Weikard, Hans-Peter.

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

Tipo: Working Paper

Palavras-chave: River Sharing; Water Trade; Market Emergence; Property Rights; Coalition Stability; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; D74; H23; Q25.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122860

Quality Ambiguity and the Market Mechanism for Credence Goods

Benner, Dietrich.

With credence goods consumers cannot judge actual quality neither before purchase (ex ante) nor after purchase (ex post). Trust has to replace own examination and verification. Applying Choquet-Expected Utility theory, ageneral model of credence goods is developed wich takes the problem of trust explicitly in its view and generalizes the problem of quality uncertainty on the 'market for lemmons' of Akerlof (1970) to 'quality ambiguity' with credence goods. The model shows the market mechanism only performing well in providing credence goods when consumers' trust in given information is not too low. With trust too low, sellers of credence good will be driven out of the market by trust induced adverse selection. In market equilibrium prices will always be...

Small World Networks with Segregation Patterns and Brokers

Palavras-chave: Credence goods; Asymmetric information; Quality ambiguity; Quality uncertainty; Adverse selection; Ambiguity; Choquet expected utility; Agricultural and Food Policy; Marketing; C72; D81; D82.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98639

Gallo, Edoardo.

Many social networks have the following properties: (i) a short average distance between any two individuals; (ii) a high clustering coefficient; (iii) segregation patterns; the presence of (iv) brokers and (v) hubs. (i) and (ii) define a small world network. This paper develops a strategic network formation model where agents have heterogeneous knowledge of the network: cognizant agents know the whole network, while ignorant ones are less knowledgeable. For a broad range of parameters, all pairwise Nash (PN) networks have properties (i)-(iv). There are some PN networks with one hub. Cognizant agents have higher betweenness centrality: they are the brokers who connect different parts of the network. Ignorant agents cause the emergence of segregation...

Exogenous Targeting Instruments under Differing Information Conditions

Palavras-chave: Network; Cognitive Network; Small World; Broker; Segregation; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; D85.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50712

Spraggon, John M..

This paper tests the ability of an exogenous targeting instrument to induce compliance when the principal cannot observe the actions of individual agents. A number of papers show that although these instruments are able to induce groups to the target outcome, they are not able to induce individuals to make socially optimal decisions in a number of different controlled laboratory experiments. This study investigates whether the information individuals have about others’ payoffs affects how they make their decisions in this environment. Ledyard (1995) suggests that when subjects have less information in public goods experiments they are more likely to choose the Nash equilibrium decision. However, as he points out, this effect differs between groups with...

Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games

Palavras-chave: Moral Hazard in Groups; Exogenous Targeting Instruments; Experiments; Information; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C92; D70.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7383

Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela.

We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching which is either a game solvable through iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS), a pure Coordination game or a Coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria. We find strong evidence that participants do extrapolate between games. Playing a strategically different game hurts compared to the control treatment where no guessing game is played before and in fact impedes convergence to Nash equilibrium in both the 3x3 IEDS and the Coordination games. Playing...

Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design for Stated Choice Surveys: A Multiple Alternative Choice Case

Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Learning; Extrapolation; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C91.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98475

Das, Chhandita; Anderson, Christopher M..

Paper removed by author 02/04/09.

Incorporating Fairness Motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium Concepts: An Application to 2x2 Games

Palavras-chave: Stated choice survey; Mechanism design; Public goods experiment; Demand and Price Analysis; C42; C72; C92; D02; H41; Q51.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9823

Tavoni, Alessandro.

Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts which perform better empirically; one such example is the impulse balance equilibrium (Selten, Chmura, 2008), which introduces a psychological reference point to which players compare the available payoff allocations. This paper is concerned with advancing two new, empirically sound, concepts: equity-driven impulse balance equilibrium (EIBE) and equity-driven quantal response equilibrium (EQRE): both introduce a distributive reference point to the corresponding...

The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model

Palavras-chave: Fairness; Inequity aversion; Aspiration level; Impulse balance; Quantal Response; Behavioral economics; Experimental economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C91; D01; D63.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50740

Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; Duval, Romain; Massetti, Emanuele; Tavoni, Massimo.

This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant...

GOVERNMENT VS. ANARCHY: MODELING THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS

Palavras-chave: Climate Policy; Climate Coalition; Game Theory; Free Riding; Environmental Economics and Policy; C68; C72; D58; Q54.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54281

Mittenzwei, Klaus; Bullock, David S..

This paper gives a general mathematical definition of an institution, and presents an explicit formal method by which to incorporate institutions in a standard general equilibrium model. We illustrate our concept using a modified Prisoner's dilemma game in which property rights over natural resources emerge from an anarchy-like state of nature. Two players decide voluntarily and non-cooperatively whether to give up some fraction of their personal resource to set up an enforcement mechanism that punishes defecting players (i.e., players that do not opt to cooperate). This enforcement mechanism constitutes a credible threat, and is central to the establishment of bilateral cooperation (i.e, government). We highlight the importance of imperfect...

Can Co-Management Improve the Governance of A Common- Pool Resource? Lessons From A Framed Field Experiment in A Marine Protected Area in the Colombian Caribbean

Palavras-chave: Institutions; Imperfect Information; Property Rights; Decision Making; Social Games; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C72; D7; D81.

Ano: 1999

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21496

Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar; Maldonado, Jorge Higinio.

Complexities associated with the management of common pool resources (CPR) threaten governance at some marine protected areas (MPA). In this paper, using economic experimental games (EEG), we investigate the effects of both external regulation and the complementarities between internal regulation and non-coercive authority intervention—what we call co-management—on fishermen’s extraction decisions. We perform EEG with fishermen inhabiting the influence zone of an MPA in the Colombian Caribbean. The results show that co- management exhibits the best results, both in terms of resource sustainability and reduction in extraction, highlighting the importance of strategies that recognize communities as key actors in the decision-making process for the...

(Anti-) Coordination in Networks

Palavras-chave: Common-pool resources; Governance; Co-management; Experimental economic games; Fisheries; Latin America.; Environmental Economics and Policy; C93; C72; D02; D70; Q01; Q22; Q28; C23; C25.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60731

Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, Jose Gabriel.

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are...

Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed?

Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Networks; Coordination Problems; Experiments; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; C90; C91; D85.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61370

Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Tavoni, Massimo.

This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1) countries decide to delay their GHG emission reductions by 30 years. What would be the cost difference between this scenario and a case in which both developed and developing countries start reducing their emissions at the same time? Then, we look at a scenario in which the timing of developing countries’ participation is uncertain and again we compute the costs of climate policy in developed and developing countries. We find that delayed participation of NA1 countries has...