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| Registros recuperados: 66 | |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Sgobbi, Alessandra; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global stabilisation target to be... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Uncertainty; Climate Policy; Stabilisation Costs; Delayed Action; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44219 |
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| Ando, Amy Whritenour. |
| This paper conducts a test of the hypothesis that interest groups compete strategically for influence with a policy-making agency. It adapts econometric methodology from the empirical industrial organization literature that was designed to work with discrete game-theoretic models, and uses data on whether or not supporting and opposing interest groups submitted comments to the Fish and Wildlife Service about each of 173 proposals to add new species to the endangered species list. The results imply that groups do respond to variations in the expected costs and benefits of a listing when deciding whether to pressure the agency. There is no support, however, for the hypothesis that the levels of pressure exerted by the groups emerge from the Nash equilibrium... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Interest groups; Strategic competition; Empirical game theory; Endangered species; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C25; C72; D72; Q28. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10732 |
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| Cologni, Alessandro; Manera, Matteo. |
| Natural resources are generally associated to negative effects on the political environment of a country. This paper explores the impact that oil revenues have on the establishment of a given political system. Based on previous literature, a political economy perspective is employed. A simple game theoretical approach in order to explain the relationships between oil revenues, political instability (conflicts) and emergence of different political systems is presented. The implementation of particular redistributive fiscal policies together with the possibility that paternalistic or “predatory" autocracies emerge are considered. Under certain circumstances, a process of full democratization is argued not to represent an optimal choice for the oil-rich... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Natural Resources; Rentier States; Conflict and Endogenous Political Regimes; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C72; D74; O13; P16. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123277 |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; De Cian, Enrica. |
| In this paper we argue that when a subgroup of countries cooperate on emission reduction, the optimal response of non-signatory countries reflects the interaction between three potentially opposing factors, the incentive to free-ride on the benefits of cooperation, the incentive to expand the demand of fossil fuels, and the incentive to adopt cleaner technologies introduced by the coalition. Using an Integrated Assessment Model with a game theoretic structure we find that cost-benefit considerations would lead OECD countries to undertake a moderate, but increasing abatement effort (in line with the pledges subscribed in Copenhagen). Even if emission reductions are moderate, OECD countries find it optimal to allocate part of their resources to energy... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Technology Spillovers; Climate Change; Partial Cooperation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q55; C72. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/119104 |
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| Kinateder, Markus. |
| Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. Due to this and the bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also produces a network result; namely,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Repeated Game; Delayed Perfect Monitoring; Network; Communication; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C73; D85. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6377 |
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| Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram. |
| In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96668 |
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| Wheatley, W. Parker. |
| This research develops a theory of how market structure and belief formation drive survival and ownership of marketplaces. This paper explains the process for deriving theoretical predictions about these phenomena and suggests how comparison of theoretical predictions with actual outcomes in the context of agricultural Internet marketplaces provides an empirical test. By providing a sound understanding of the driving forces behind Internet marketplace ownership, a factual basis is introduced relative to concerns about concentration of the ownership of Internet marketplaces in the hands of buyers or sellers in agricultural markets. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Internet markets; Equilibrium selection; Commodity markets; Ownership; Agribusiness; L19; Q13; C72. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22214 |
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| Maldonado, Jorge Higinio; Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar. |
| Economic Experimental Games (EEGs), focused to analyze dilemmas associated with the use of common pool resources, have shown that individuals make extraction decisions that deviate from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have analyzed whether these deviations towards the social optimum are affected as the stock of resource changes. Performing EEG with local fishermen, we test the hypothesis that the behavior of participants differs under a situation of abundance versus one of scarcity. Our findings show that under a situation of scarcity, players over-extract a given resource, and thus make decisions above the Nash equilibrium; in doing so, they obtain less profit, mine the others-regarding interest, and exacerbate the tragedy of the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Tragedy of the commons intensified; Economic experimental games; Resource abundance; Resource scarcity; Dynamic effects; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; Public Economics; D01; D02; D03; O13; O54; Q01; Q22; C93; C72; C73; C23. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91170 |
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| Registros recuperados: 66 | |
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