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de Janvry, Alain; Sadoulet, Elisabeth. |
Temptation for tenants to under-report output levels under share contracts is undoubtedly high. There is evidence that theft of product occurs and that this affects the design of share contracts. In this case, the optimal output share is chosen to not only induce effort but also to reduce theft of product, while meeting the landlord's limited liability obligation. The tenant's share thus rises with his desire and ability to steal. The optimal contract allows both residual inefficiency in the provision of effort and residual cheating. This contract is also modified by process utility in cheating, ability of the landlord to supervise, risk of revenge with abusive surveillance, and switch to products less prone to theft. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Sharecropping; Cheating; Agrarian contract; Farm Management; Labor and Human Capital; D82; Q15; O17. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25119 |
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Gustafson, Cole R.. |
The availability of online computerized assessments is increasing, especially for economics principles courses. A severe limitation of online assessments is the possibility of cheating. Scant information is available on student preferences, behavior, and learning that is accomplished when online assessments are completed either independently or in team settings. This study investigates the performance of students in a macro-economics principles course that recently adopted online assessment with an "open book, open friend" policy. Several strategies were developed that encouraged students to learn the material independently. Data were collected throughout the semester to quantify the number of students who actually did have a friend assist them... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Assessment; Plagiarism; Cheating; Online; Teams; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession. |
Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23659 |
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de Janvry, Alain; Sadoulet, Elisabeth; Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto. |
This paper has two objectives. The first is to analyze the effectiveness of the scarcity management strategy used for the Fall 2004 U.S. flu vaccine shortage, based on defining priority groups and calling on self-restraint to favor these groups. The second is to reveal differentiated behavioral responses across categories of individuals and the apparent motivations behind these responses. To do this, we observed the responses of the members of a campus population to two distinct randomized treatments in a designed field experiment during the flu vaccine shortage. Corresponding to the management strategy followed by the Center for Disease Control, one treatment provided information about a sharply reduced number of vaccination clinics (scarcity) and their... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Randomized experiment; Shortage; Self-restraint; Cheating; Health Economics and Policy; C93. |
Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7162 |
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