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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (4) Autor Karp, Larry S. (4) Zhang, Jiangfeng (4) Palavra-chave Asymmetric information (4) Choice of instruments (4) D8 (4) Q28 (4) C61 (3) Environmental Economics and Policy (3) H21 (3) Pollution control (3) Investment (2) Rational expectations (2) Bayesian learning (1) C6l (1) Climate change (1) Cll (1) Correlated costs (1) Dynamic optimization (1) H2l (1) Learning (1) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Thesis or Dissertation (1) Ano 2008 (1) 2003 (1) 2002 (1) 2001 (1) País United States (4) Idioma Inglês (4)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Controlling a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Capital and Asymmetric Information AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Zhang, Jiangfeng. Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Investment; Asymmetric information; Rational expectations; Choice of instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25071 Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Zhang, Jiangfeng. Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms’ beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement. Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Investment; Asymmetric information; Rational expectations; Choice of instruments; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42877 Regulation of Stock Externalities with Correlated Costs AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Zhang, Jiangfeng. We study a dynamic regulation model where firms' actions contribute to a stock externality. The regulator and firms have asymmetric information about serially correlated abatement costs. With price-based policies such as taxes, or if firms trade quotas efficiently, the regulator learns about the evolution of both stock and costs. This ability to learn about costs is important in determining the ranking of taxes and quotas, and in determining the value of a feedback rather than an open-loop policy. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Asymmetric information; Learning; Correlated costs; Choice of instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25077 Bayesian Learning and the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Zhang, Jiangfeng. We study the importance of anticipated learning - about both environmental damages and abatement costs - in determining the level and the method of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. We also compare active learning, passive learning, and parameter uncertainty without learning. Current beliefs about damages and abatement costs have an important effect on the optimal level of emissions, However, the optimal level of emissions is not sensitive either to the possibility of learning about damages. or to the type of learning (active or passive), Taxes dominate quotas, but by a small margin. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate change; Uncertainty; Bayesian learning; Asymmetric information; Choice of instruments; Dynamic optimization; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Cll; C6l; D8; H2l; Q28. Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6214 Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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