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| Werners, Saskia E.; ; werners@mungo.nl; Matczak, Piotr; ; matczak@amu.edu.pl; Flachner, Zsuzsanna ; ; flachner@rissac.hu. |
| This paper offers a novel interpretation of the introduction of floodplain rehabilitation and rural development into the water policy for the Tisza River in Hungary. It looks at the role of individuals and the strategies that they used to bring about water policy change. Five strategies are explored: developing new ideas, building coalitions to sell ideas, using windows of opportunity, playing multiple venues and orchestrating networks. Our discussion on the importance of each strategy and the individuals behind it is based on interviews, group discussions and a literature review. The international and political attention sparked by a series of floods, dike failure and a major cyanide spill, which preceded national elections, opened a window of opportunity... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Reports |
Palavras-chave: Coalition; Individual actor; Hungary; Tisza River; Transition; Water policy change. |
| Ano: 2010 |
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| Zissimos, Ben. |
| This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries, a familiar problem of coordination failure arises giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of many possible trade agreements can form. With distance between countries, and through strategic interaction in tariff setting, regional trade agreements generate larger rent-shifting effects than non regional agreements, which countries use to coordinate on a unique equilibrium. Under naive best responses, regional agreements give way to free trade. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coalition; Coordination; Trade Liberalization; Trade Agreement; Regionalism; International Relations/Trade; F02; F13; F15; C73. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9102 |
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| Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, Marc. |
| Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coalition; Fallback Process; Kingmaker Leader; Cardinally Single-peaked; Ordinally Single-peaked; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C71; C78; D72. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52337 |
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