|
|
|
|
|
| Dowell, Andrew J.; Wooldridge, Michael; McBurney, Peter. |
| Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bribery; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity; Marketing; C63; C78. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7444 |
| |
|
|
| Finus, Michael; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. |
| Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms? |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Ancillary Benefits; Climate Policy; Coalition Formation; Game Theory; Impure Public Goods; C72; H87; Q54. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42902 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
