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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (5) Autor Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray (1) Dimitrov, Dinko (1) Dowell, Andrew J. (1) Finus, Michael (1) Marrouch, Walid (1) McBurney, Peter (1) Rubbelke, Dirk T.G. (1) Sung, Shao Chin (1) Wooldridge, Michael (1) Zhao, Jingang (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Coalition Formation (5) C63 (2) C71 (2) Computational Complexity (2) Q54 (2) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (2) Adaptation (1) Additive Preferences (1) Ancillary Benefits (1) Bribery (1) C62 (1) C70 (1) C72 (1) C78 (1) Climate Change (1) Climate Policy (1) Core (1) D02 (1) D70 (1) D71 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (5) Ano 2011 (1) 2008 (3) 2007 (1) País United States (5) Idioma Inglês (5)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games AgEcon Zhao, Jingang. This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in coalitional TU games. Finally, it obtains analogous results in coalitional NTU (non-transferable utility) games. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Coalition Formation; Core; Maximal Payoff; Minimum No-Blocking Payoff; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C62; C71. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6298 International Environmental Agreements in the Presence of Adaptation AgEcon Marrouch, Walid; Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray. We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change, apart from directly reducing the damage caused by climate change, may also indirectly mitigate greenhouse gas emissions by increasing the stable size of international agreements on emission reductions. Moreover, we show that the more effective the adaptive measure in terms of reducing the marginal damage from emissions, the larger the stable size of the international environmental agreement. In addition, we show that larger coalitions, in the presence of adaptation, may lead to lower global emission levels and higher welfare. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreements; Adaptation; Coalition Formation; Climate Change; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q59. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102572 Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy AgEcon Finus, Michael; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms? Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Ancillary Benefits; Climate Policy; Coalition Formation; Game Theory; Impure Public Goods; C72; H87; Q54. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42902 The Computational Difficulty of Bribery in Qualitative Coalitional Games AgEcon Dowell, Andrew J.; Wooldridge, Michael; McBurney, Peter. Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Bribery; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity; Marketing; C63; C78. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7444 Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games AgEcon Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko. We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Additive Preferences; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity; Hedonic Games; NP-hard; NP-complete; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C63; C70; C71; D02; D70; D71. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46655 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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