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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Ansink, Erik (1) Breton, Michele (1) Gengenbach, Michael (1) Sbragia, Lucia (1) Weikard, Hans-Peter (1) Zaccour, Georges (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Coalition Stability (2) Environmental Economics and Policy (2) C72 (1) C73 (1) D74 (1) H23 (1) International Environmental Agreements (1) International Relations/Trade (1) Market Emergence (1) Non‐Cooperative Dynamic Game (1) Property Rights (1) Q25 (1) Q53 (1) River Sharing (1) Water Trade (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working Paper (1) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2008 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última River Sharing and Water Trade AgEcon Ansink, Erik; Gengenbach, Michael; Weikard, Hans-Peter. We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory. Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: River Sharing; Water Trade; Market Emergence; Property Rights; Coalition Stability; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; D74; H23; Q25. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122860 Dynamic Models for International Environmental Agreements AgEcon Breton, Michele; Sbragia, Lucia; Zaccour, Georges. In this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing its own welfare, whereas a signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. Signatory countries are assumed to be able to punish the non-signatories at a cost. When countries decide on their pollution emissions they account for the evolution of the pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations with partial... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreements; Non‐Cooperative Dynamic Game; Coalition Stability; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; C73; Q53. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6231 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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