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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (4) Autor Cherry, Todd L. (1) Kohler, Marion (1) Kulmala, Soile (1) Levontin, Polina (1) Lindroos, Marko (1) McEvoy, David M. (1) Pintassilgo, Pedro (1) Stranlund, John K. (1) Wood, Peter John (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Coalition formation (4) Atlantic salmon (1) Bioeconomic model (1) C92 (1) Climate change negotiations (1) Currency unions (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Experiments (1) F33 (1) F42 (1) Financial Economics (1) Free-riding (1) Game theory (1) H41 (1) Implementation theory (1) Inequality aversion (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) International policy coordination (1) Participation requirement (1) Partition function (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Journal Article (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2010 (2) 2004 (1) País United States (4) Idioma Inglês (4)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Competing Coalitions in International Monetary Policy Games AgEcon Kohler, Marion. In Kohler (2002) we analyse coalition formation in monetary policy coordination games between n countries. We find that positive spillovers of the coalition formation process and the resulting free-rider problem limit the stable coalition size: since the coalition members are bound by the union's discipline, an outsider can successfully export inflation without fearing that the insiders will try to do the same. In this paper, based on the same model, we allow countries to join competing coalitions. The formation of a large currency bloc is not sustainable since it would impose too much discipline on all participants. However, the co-existence of several smaller currency blocs may be a second-best solution to the free-riding problem of monetary policy... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Currency unions; International policy coordination; Free-riding; Coalition formation; Financial Economics; F33; F42. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26274 The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence AgEcon McEvoy, David M.; Cherry, Todd L.; Stranlund, John K.. This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public goods; Coalition formation; Inequality aversion; Participation requirement; Experiments; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; C92; H41. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102265 Climate Change and Game Theory AgEcon Wood, Peter John. This survey paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, games where players make decisions about treaty participation, and games where players make decisions about treaty ratification, are examined. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, is examined. Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behaviour of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One way to achieve... Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Climate change negotiations; Game theory; Implementation theory; Coalition formation; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95061 Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation AgEcon Kulmala, Soile; Levontin, Polina; Lindroos, Marko; Pintassilgo, Pedro. This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four asymmetric players with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Atlantic salmon; Bioeconomic model; Coalition formation; Partition function; Sharing rules; Stability analysis; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59094 Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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