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| Weese, Eric. |
| Political coalition formation games can describe the formation and dissolution of nations, as well as the creation of coalition governments, the establishment of political parties, and other similar phenomena. These games have been studied from a theoretical perspective, but the resulting models have not been used extensively in empirical work. This paper presents a method of estimating political coalition formation models with many-player coalitions, and then illustrates this method by estimating structural coefficients that describe the behaviour of municipalities during a recent set of municipal mergers in Japan. The method enables counterfactual analysis, which in the Japanese case shows that the national government could increase welfare via a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: C63; D71; H77; Political Economy; Public Economics; Computational techniques; Coalitions; Municipalities. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/107268 |
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| Revilla, Pablo. |
| This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agents preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents preferences, we show that two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge. The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects real-life situations in which agents are more concerned about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers to markets in which a workers ranking is accepted by workers and firms present... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Many-to-one matching; Hedonic; Coalitions; Stability; Colleagues; Marketing; C78; D71. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7443 |
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| Dimitrov, Dinko; Lazarova, Emiliya A.. |
| A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in and over the student groups he would like to teach to. Correspondingly, each student has preferences over the groups of students he wants to study with and over the teams of researchers he would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of agents’ preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coalitions; Common Rankings; Core; Stability; Totally Balanced Games; Two-Sided Matchings; C78; J41; D71. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37523 |
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