Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (1) Autor Coatney, Kalyn T. (1) Menkhaus, Dale J. (1) Scheer, Jennifer L. (1) Shaffer, Sherrill L. (1) Palavra-chave Antitrust (1) Common Agency (1) Common Value Auctions (1) D44 (1) Industrial Organization (1) K21 (1) K23 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2010 (1) País United States (1) Idioma Inglês (1)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 1 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Unilateral and Exclusionary/Strategic Effects of Common Agency: Price Impacts in a Repeated Common Value English Auction AgEcon Coatney, Kalyn T.; Shaffer, Sherrill L.; Menkhaus, Dale J.; Scheer, Jennifer L.. The business justification for multiple principals to hire a common agent is efficiency. Our empirical study demonstrates that the creation of the common agent unilaterally depresses winning bids. Additionally, the common agent was not only observed to be the dominant bidder but also paid significantly lower prices than fringe competitors (price/quantity differential). The observed price/quantity differential is consistent with the almost common value English auction theory developed by Rose and Kagel (2008) in which a cost advantaged bidder is able to reduce competition by credibly raising the costs of disadvantaged rivals associated with the winner’s curse. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Common Value Auctions; Common Agency; Antitrust; Industrial Organization; D44; K21; K23. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56529 Registros recuperados: 1 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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