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QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS OF CONSERVATION AUCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM AN ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT AgEcon
Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven.
Building on available theory, this work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the budgetary and the economic performance of competitive tenders for allocating conservation contracts to landholders. Experiments have been replicated in two different countries to check for robustness of results. We find that auctions outperform the more traditional fixed-price schemes only in the one-shot setting. With repetition, the auctions quickly lose their edge. Our results suggest that previous estimates of conservation auction performance are too optimistic.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Conservation auctions; Agri-environmental policy; Experimental economics.; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7616
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An Experimental Examination of Target Based Conservation Auctions AgEcon
Boxall, Peter C.; Perger, Orsolya; Packman, Katherine.
Conservation auctions (CA) are typically employed to increase the provision of Ecological Goods and Services (EG&S) for achieving environmental goals. This paper exmaines the ability of a CA to meet an environmental target. Previous research on this topic used the number of contracts as a target rather than some specified environmental goal. We used experimental economic methods benchmarked to a wetlands restoration case study to examine a target constraint that must be met by bidders rather than a budget constraint. However, since no budget constraint is employed, agencies with limited resources might have to use other auction design procedures to ensure that financial outlays to pay winning bidders are not too high while meeting the target....
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Conservation auctions; Environmental target; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q52; Q58; D44.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121624
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The Effective Use of Limited Information: Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Cost in Asymmetric Auctions? AgEcon
Hellerstein, Daniel; Higgins, Nathaniel.
Conservation programs faced with limited budgets often use a competitive enrollment mechanism. Goals of enrollment might include minimizing program expenditures, encouraging broad participation, and inducing adoption of enhanced environmental practices. We use experimental methods to evaluate an auction mechanism that incorporates bid maximums and quality adjustments. We examine this mechanism’s performance characteristics when opportunity costs are heterogeneous across potential participants, and when costs are only approximately known by the purchaser. We find that overly stringent maximums can increase overall expenditures, and that when quality of offers is important, substantial increases in offer maximums can yield a better quality-adjusted result.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Conservation auctions; Conservation Reserve Program; CRP; Bid caps; Experimental economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90850
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