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| Maze, Armelle. |
| The optimal level of formalisation of contracts and their dynamic is at stake in the economic literature on the optimum design of ex post renegotiation with third party enforcement. Another theoretical interpretation is that contract adaptations may also reflect mutual learning process between contractors. Why transactors write explicit contract that they know cannot be court enforced? The central idea is that explicit contract terms makes it clearer to the transactors what has been agreed upon, thus are decreasing the cost of private enforcement sanctions (Klein, 1996). Empirical evidences are provided by the diachronic analysis of the full set of tri-partite contracts between one of the top-ten french large retailer and its beef suppliers before and... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contract design; Hold-up problems; Beef sector; Self-Enforcement; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24957 |
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| Fraser, Iain. |
| This paper examines wine grape supply contracts used in the main grape growing regions of Australia. An empirical analysis provides insight into specific aspects of contract design and implementation. Statistical analyses of sample data reveal differences between regions in contract specifications. Lower quality grape growing regions place a greater reliance on grape quality assessment to determine bonus/penalty payments compared to higher quality regions. Contracts in higher quality regions place greater emphasis on explicit winery involvement and direction in vineyard management.Results indicate that longer duration contracts are more inclusive in terms of the number of clauses included. Evidence of risk shifting (i.e., winery to grower) for high quality... |
| Tipo: Article |
Palavras-chave: Contract design; Supply contracts; Wine grapes; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118435 |
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