Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Doye, Damona G. (2) Epplin, Francis M. (2) Hossain, Ishrat (2) Yoder, Jonathan K. (2) Wang, Chenguang (1) Palavra-chave Contract duration (3) Division of labor (2) Land Economics/Use (2) Land lease contracts (2) Moral hazard (2) BCAP (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Incentive (1) Industrial Organization (1) J43 (1) L23 (1) Labor and Human Capital (1) Production Economics (1) Q15 (1) Take-and-Run (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2005 (1) 2004 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases AgEcon Yoder, Jonathan K.; Hossain, Ishrat; Epplin, Francis M.; Doye, Damona G.. Short-term contracts provide weak incentives for durable input investment if post-contract asset transfer is difficult. Our model shows that when both agents provide inputs, optimal contract length balances weak incentives of one agent against the other. This perspective broadens the existing contract duration literature, which emphasizes the tradeoff between risk sharing and contract costs. We develop hypotheses and test them based on private grazing contracts from the Southern Great Plains. We find broad support for the implications of our model. For example, landowners provide durable land-specific inputs more often under annual versus multiyear contracts. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Land lease contracts; Moral hazard; Contract duration; Division of labor; Labor and Human Capital; Land Economics/Use; J43; L23; Q15. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12962 Moral hazard and the division of labor in agricultural land leases AgEcon Hossain, Ishrat; Yoder, Jonathan K.; Epplin, Francis M.; Doye, Damona G.. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Land lease contracts; Moral hazard; Contract duration; Division of labor; Land Economics/Use. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59366 How Policy Affects Incentives and Contract Duration in Biomass Production AgEcon Wang, Chenguang. Policies such as Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP) which aim to assist farmers with biomass production may act as a double-edged sword. On one hand, they lure farmers to adopt biomass production in the short term. On the other hand, they can’t be irresponsible for farmers’ abandonment of biomass production in the long run. The paper sharpens this idea in a principal-agent setting and argues that by offering a timely loyalty premium the agents’ take-and-run behavior can be mitigated. Moreover, the model shows that effort and investment in human capital are increasing in loyalty premium when agents decide to continue providing biomass after testing-water contract expires. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: BCAP; Incentive; Contract duration; Take-and-Run; Environmental Economics and Policy; Industrial Organization; Production Economics. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103335 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco