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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (5) Autor Alexander, Corinne E. (1) Avendano, Daniela (1) Bardsley, Peter (1) Burfurd, Ingrid (1) Olesen, Henrik Ballebye (1) Reyes, Alvaro (1) Rosch, Stephanie D. (1) Tyner, Wallace E. (1) Wu, Steven Y. (1) Yoder, Jonathan K. (1) Yoder, Joshua (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Contract theory (5) Industrial Organization (2) Adverse selection (1) Agribusiness (1) Biodiversity (1) Biofuels (1) Chile. (1) Coordination (1) Crop Production/Industries (1) Fruit growers (1) Incentives (1) Industrial organization (1) Livestock production (1) Marketing (1) Miscanthus (1) Moral hazard (1) Procurement (1) Renegotiation-proof contract (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Risk sharing (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (3) Journal Article (1) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2010 (1) 2009 (2) 2001 (1) 1999 (1) País United States (5) Idioma Inglês (4) Espanhol (1)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Factores que determinan la presencia de problemas entre productores de fruta fresca y empresas exportadoras, en la Zona Central de Chile AgEcon Avendano, Daniela; Reyes, Alvaro. Published by Asociación de Economistas Agrarios de Chile Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Supply chain; Contract theory; Fruit growers; Chile.; Crop Production/Industries; Industrial Organization. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97374 Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement AgEcon Bardsley, Peter; Burfurd, Ingrid. Market based instruments are proving increasingly effective in biodiversity procurement and in regulatory schemes to preserve biodiversity. The design of these policy instruments brings together issues in auction design, contract theory, biology, and monitoring technology. Using a mixed adverse selection, moral hazard model, we show that optimal contract design may differ significantly between procurement and regulatory policy environments. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Biodiversity; Procurement; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Contract theory. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48047 CONTRACTING OVER COMMON PROPERTY: COST-SHARE CONTRACTS FOR PREDATOR CONTROL AgEcon Yoder, Jonathan K.. Predator control cost-share contracts among livestock producers in North America date back to 1630. A model is developed which provides refutable implications for the structure and distribution of these contracts over time and space. Historical and contemporary state and county level data on sheep producer coyote control generally support the model. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Contract theory; Wildlife; Livestock production; Industrial Organization; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21657 Making a market for Miscanthus: Can new contract designs solve the biofuel investment hold-up problem? AgEcon Wu, Steven Y.; Rosch, Stephanie D.; Alexander, Corinne E.; Tyner, Wallace E.; Yoder, Joshua. We present designs for optimal contracts to solve the investment hold-up problem for perennial crops for the biofuel industry. A fixed-price contract is ex-ante efficient but renegotiation-proof for a limited range of discount parameters. A perfectly- indexed contract is both renegotiation-proof and ex-post efficient. Provided long-run land prices are stationary, the expected cost for both contracts converges to the long-run expected price of land for a risk-neutral farmer. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Biofuels; Miscanthus; Contract theory; Industrial organization; Renegotiation-proof contract; Marketing. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61743 Contract Production of Green Peas AgEcon Olesen, Henrik Ballebye. This paper analyzes a contract between farmers and a large company in the Danish food industry, Danisco Foods. Production of green peas requires a very accurate coordination, which is obtained through centralized decision-making. The contract is based on a tournament system providing risk sharing between the farmers. General problems from the contract theory such as hold up, moral hazard, risk sharing and screening are analyzed. The paper illustrates the tradeoffs between these problems in design of contracts. By negotiating the contract through a pea-growers association, the farmers gain some bargaining power. Thus the farmers can ensure that Danisco Foods uses only one contract for all farmers. This paper analyzes the consequences of the farmers'... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Contract theory; Coordination; Incentives; Risk sharing; Agribusiness. Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24200 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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