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| Registros recuperados: 64 | |
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| Liebrand, Carolyn; Carley, Dale H.; Ling, K. Charles. |
| Southern dairy farmers' perception of their cooperative's or proprietary handler's performance, level of satisfaction with the milk handler, and reasons for staying with the handler, or for shifting handlers, were evaluated. The data were from a 1989 mail survey of Southern dairy farmers. The dairy farmers' differing evaluations of their milk handlers depended on the type of handler they dealt with, geographic location, and/or the characteristics of the farm and farmer. Generally, dairy farmers were concerned about price, deductions, and assessments. The price farmers received appeared to be a significant factor affecting farmers' satisfaction level. There appeared to be a tradeoff between price and deductions versus service, and market and payment... |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Milk handler; Proprietary handler; Assured market; Price; S-217; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 1991 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51568 |
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| Sell, Randall S.; Nudell, Daniel J.; Bangsund, Dean A.; Leistritz, F. Larry; Faller, Timothy. |
| This report presents an economic feasibility study of a 5,000 head, cooperatively owned, sheep operation for leafy spurge control. The objectives were 1) determine the return on investment of the cooperative, 2) determine the proposed structure of the cooperative, and 3) ascertain the amount of capital investment required by members in the cooperative. Three sheep flock management alternatives were initially considered for the cooperative. These were 1) winter lambing, 2) spring lambing, and 3) fall lambing. The fall lambing scenario was determined to be infeasible because of logistics associated with gathering and transportation of pregnant ewes and lack of grazing pressure on leafy spurge throughout the grazing season. The total capital investment... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Leafy Spurge; Cooperative; Weed Control; Sheep Grazing; Economics; Farm Management; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23270 |
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| Gray, Thomas W.. |
| This study examines the membership structure of a large centralized cooperative from an organizational workability view. Structure is created by dividing membership organizationally, i.e., assigning different roles and tasks to different groups of members, as well as to individual members, and bringing coordination to these differentiations. The membership structure of the case cooperative was found large in number of members, highly differentiated, and well coordinated. The structuring, i.e., creating a division of labor among the membership, and the coordinating of these divisions is done in response to conditions in the membership environment. |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Organization; Paradigm; Specialization; Coordination; Complexity; Stability/instability; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 1991 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52016 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
| Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that fails to attract non-farm, or "private" investment? We hypothesize that doing so is a costly mechanism for increasing the maximum penalty farmers face in the case of business failure. For a given market environment, exposing farmers to this risk increases the amount of surplus that can be used to repay lenders, thus expanding the set of market environments in which financing is available. We show how equity investment of this sort can be an efficient organizational response to a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Corporate finance; Moral hazard; Vertical integration; Agribusiness; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18610 |
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| Sorensen, Ann-Christin; Tennbakk, Berit. |
| We have employed a simple model to analyse market regulation in a situation with multifunctional agricultural production, i.e., a public good produced jointly with a private good, and where there is imperfect competition in processing. We have analysed the impact on welfare of two archetype regulatory institutions formed to overcome the market imperfections. The institutions, a Regulatory Marketing Board and a Regulatory Marketing Cooperative, are both represented in the Norwegian agricultural market. Taking into account the cost of public funds, we find that the Board in general ensures the highest social welfare. The Cooperative does not replicate the Board solution unless restricted by a price cap and in combination with a production subsidy. If the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Marketing board; Multifunctionality; Oligopsony; Trade; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24916 |
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| Sorensen, Ann-Christin. |
| The food processing industry in Western countries operates in markets that usually are highly concentrated, consisting of a few cooperatives and investor-owned firms. However, in the literature some studies questioned whether the mixed market structure is a stable equilibrium, and suggestions are made that the cooperatives eventually will crowd out all investor-owned firms. To analyse the problem, the family of models of mixed markets is generalized and analysed. It is shown that a mixed market equilibrium may occur under quite general conditions. Also, it is shown that the investor-owned firm may serve as a yardstick of production to the cooperative, helping farmers achieve an increased payoff relative to a situation with a single coop in the market. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Endogenous membership; Investor-owned-firm; Mixed market; Yardstick of production; Agribusiness; L11; L13; P12; P13; Q13. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24741 |
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| Ling, K. Charles. |
| The rationale for compensating dairy cooperatives for the costs incurred in balancing milk supply for the fluid market is examined. A reserve-balancing pool is proposed to facilitate deducting supply-balancing service credit from a marketwide producer pool and making payment to cooperatives for providing the services. The volume of necessary reserves maintained for the fluid market determines the size of the reserve-balancing pool. A dairy cooperative qualifies for pool payment based on the volume of milk delivered for fluid uses and on the volume of necessary reserves actually balanced. An alternative qualification is to allocate the volume of necessary reserves each cooperative has to balance according to a cooperative's market share of milk for fluid... |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Milk; Reserve-balancing pool; Seasonality; Manufacturing costs; Marketwide services; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 1985 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50731 |
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| Registros recuperados: 64 | |
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