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| Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, Jose Gabriel. |
| We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Networks; Coordination Problems; Experiments; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; C90; C91; D85. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61370 |
