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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (5) Autor Karp, Larry S. (5) Paul, Thierry (1) Stevenson, Megan (1) Palavra-chave Coordination games (5) Multiple equilibria (4) C79 (3) Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Global games (3) L51 (3) Q58 (3) Tradable permits (3) California AB32 (2) Climate change policies (2) Regulatory uncertainty (2) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (2) Asymmetric information (1) C61 (1) Costs of adjustment (1) Environmental externality (1) F13 (1) F18 (1) Factor reallocation (1) Green industrial policy (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Working Paper (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2008 (2) 2006 (1) 2005 (1) País United States (5) Idioma Inglês (5)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Correct (and misleading) argument for using market-based pollution control policies AgEcon Karp, Larry S.. One argument in favor of market based pollution control policies is sometimes exaggerated, and a different argument is usually ignored. Regardless of whether investment is fixed or endogenous, market based policies might lead to a higher or lower equilibrium abatement compared to the level under command and control policies. Therefore, economists should be cautious about trying to convince anti-market environmentalists of the benefit of market based policies on the grounds that these promote environmental goals. However, market based policies reduce regulatory uncertainty. Under command and control emissions policies, there are multiple rational expectations competitive equilibria at the investment stage. From the standpoint of individual firms, this... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Tradable permits; Coordination games; Multiple equilibria; Global games; Regulatory uncertainty; Climate change policies; California AB32; Environmental Economics and Policy; C79; L51; Q58. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6030 Green industrial policy: trade and theory AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Stevenson, Megan. This paper studies the reality and the potential for green industrial policy. We provide a summary of the green industrial policies, broadly understood, for five countries. We then consider the relation between green industrial policies and trade disputes, emphasizing the Brazil-US dispute involving ethanol and the broader US-China dispute. The theory of public policy provides many lessons for green industrial policy. We select four of these lessons, involving the Green Paradox, the choice of quantities versus prices with endogenous investment, the coordination issues arising from emissions control, and the ability of green industrial policies to promote cooperation in reducing a global public bad like carbon emissions. Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Green industrial policy; Trade conflicts; Green paradox; Asymmetric information; Coordination games; Participation games; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; F13; F18; H21; H23. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123637 Multiplicity of investment equilibria when pollution permits are not tradable AgEcon Karp, Larry S.. We study a model in which the level of environmental regulation depends on abatement costs, which depend on aggregate levels of investment in abatement capital. Firms are non-strategic. When emissions quotas are not tradable, there are multiple competitive equilibria to the investment problem. Allowing trade in permits leads to a unique socially optimal equilibrium. For a given distribution of investment, allowing trade in permits has an ambiguous effect on the optimal level of regulation. Previous results on coordination games with non-atomic agents are applied to the problem of environmental regulation with endogenous investment in abatement capital. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Tradable permits; Coordination games; Multiple equilibria; Global games; Environmental Economics and Policy; C79; L51; Q58. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7202 Friction and the Multiplicity of Equilibria AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Paul, Thierry. In familiar models, a decrease in the friction facing mobile factors (e.g., lowering their adjustment costs) increases a coordination problem, leading to more circumstances where there are multiple equilibria. We show that a decrease in friction can decrease coordination problems if, for example, a production externality arises from a changing stock of knowledge or a changing environmental stock. In general, the relation between the amount of friction that mobile factors face and the likelihood of multiple equilibria is non-monotonic. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Indeterminacy; Multiple equilibria; Coordination games; Factor reallocation; Environmental externality; Learning-by-doing; Costs of adjustment; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C61; J21; O13; R23. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25120 Correct (and misleading) arguments for using market based pollution control policies AgEcon Karp, Larry S.. Disagreement over the form of regulation of greenhouse gasses motivates a comparison of market based and command and control policies. More efficient policies can increase aggregate marginal abatement cost, resulting in higher emissions. Multiple investment equilibria and “regulatory uncertainty” arise when firms anticipate command and control policies. Market based policies eliminate this uncertainty. Command and control policies cause firms to imitate other firms’ investment decisions, leading to similar costs and small potential efficiency gains from trade. Market based policies induce firms to make different investment decisions, leading to different costs and large gains from trade. We imbed the regulatory problem in a “global game” and show that the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Tradable permits; Coordination games; Multiple equilibria; Global games; Regulatory uncertainty; Climate change policies; California AB32; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C79; L51; Q58. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42868 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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