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| Dengu, T.; Lyne, Michael C.. |
| This study tests the hypothesis that an efficient rental market for cropland is a significant determinant of agricultural investment in the communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal. An efficient rental market creates an opportunity cost for under-utilisation, which tends to transfer resources to more effective users. The efficiency of a rental market is compromised by the presence of transaction costs that reduce returns for both lessees and lessors. Transaction costs include risk arising from a possible breach of the rental contract. Potential losses caused by a breach of contract can be reduced by introducing a credible third-party to witness the contract. Likewise, moral hazard can be reduced by contracting with trusted persons. Data from household surveys... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Customary institutions; Insecure land tenure; Rental market; Transaction costs; Moral hazard; Crop production; Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8012 |
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| Beyene, Fekadu. |
| This paper examines interethnic conflict on grazing land previously accessed as common property. The study was undertaken in Mieso District of eastern Ethiopia where two ethnic groups experience different production systems pastoral and agropastoral. Game theoretic approach and analytic narratives have been used as analytical tools. Results show that the historical change in land use by one of the ethnic groups, resource scarcity, violation of customary norms, power asymmetry and livestock raids are some of the factors that have contributed to the recurrence of the conflict. The role of raids in triggering conflict and restricting access to grazing area becomes particularly important. Socio-economic and political factors are responsible for power... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Property rights; Conflict; Grazing land; Power asymmetry; Access rights; Customary institutions; Mieso; Ethiopia; Africa; Land Economics/Use; O17; Z13; Q15. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7703 |
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