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Registros recuperados: 40
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ASSESSING CONSUMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR DIFFERENT UNITS OF ORGANIC MILK: EVIDENCE FROM MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS AgEcon
Akaichi, Faiçal; Gil, Jose Maria; Nayga, Rodolfo M., Jr..
Replaced with revised version of paper 06/28/10
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Multi-unit Vickrey auctions; Organic milk; Information; Agribusiness; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Marketing; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; D44.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60982
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A note on the performance measure of conservation auctions AgEcon
Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven.
We argue that previous assessments of discriminatory-price conservation auctions may have systematically overestimated their performance relative to uniform-payment schemes due to an inappropriate counterfactual comparison. We demonstrate that the cost curve (and not the bid curve) is the relevant supply curve when a uniform payment is offered and provide a theoretically rigorous counterfactual based on that insight. We estimate that the performance of BushTender may have been overrated by more than 50%.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Plus: assessment method; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100885
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Auction Markets for Specialty Food Products with Geographical Indications AgEcon
Schamel, Guenter.
We present a first analysis of auction markets for specialty food products. We identify auction prices, trade volume and value for domestic and foreign origin specialty ham with geographical indications (GIs) which were actually sold in online auctions in Germany within a one-month period. Applying hedonic modeling, we examine potential factors that may influence online bidding behavior and final auction prices. We estimate positive auction price effects for weight, bidding activity, and auction length, that the domestic product is sold at a discount, that higher shipping cost have a negative impact on final prices, and that auctions ending on Fridays and Saturdays yield lower prices. The model may be used to estimate the value of GIs. In our example, we...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Consumer economics; Geographical indications; Auctions; Information; Marketing; D12; D44; D83.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25606
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Effects of Socio-Institutional and Emotional Factors of Japanese Farmland Rental Transactions AgEcon
Kunimitsu, Yoji.
Farmland reallocation between farmers through rental transactions is critical for improving Japanese rice productivity. This study examined effects of socio-institutional and emotional factors as well as economic factors on rental transactions. A stochastic choice model was applied to contingent valuation data by considering regional heteroscedasticity. Empirical results showed (1) existence of economic inefficiencies, 3% loss of economic surplus due to socio-institutional restriction, which is probably reflected in transaction costs; (2) a 15% reduction in surplus due to emotional reluctance of farmers; and (3) strong influences of rice price, wages, and geographical location on the rental rate and agreement level.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Contingent valuation questionnaire; Economic inefficiency; Regional heteroscedasticity; Rental agreement level; Rental rate; Stochastic choice model; Crop Production/Industries; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; C25; D44; Q12; Q15; Q38; R58.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43747
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Do Farmers Value The Environment? Evidence from the Conservation Reserve Program Auctions AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav; Levy, Armando; Marra, Michele C..
The paper uses data from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auctions to elicit farmers' attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids. The CRP pays farmers to remove land from production and put it to a conservation use. An interesting aspect of these auctions is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots. The results indicate that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they consistently value those environmental improvements which are concentrated locally such as reduced soil erosion, while they place less emphasis on those benefits which resemble public goods such as air quality and wildlife habitat.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; D44; D82; Q51; Q58.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25233
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Understanding Factors That Influence Breeders to Sell Bulls at Performance Tests AgEcon
Lillywhite, Jay M.; Simonsen, J..
Breeders of purebred bulls have multiple avenues to market their bulls, including consignment at public auctions associated with performance tests. Purebred breeders often have the opportunity to withdraw bulls that are eligible to sell in these auctions. We examine sales data from a public auction held in conjunction with a performance bull test in Tucumcari, NM, to gain insights on breeder decisions to withdraw bulls prior to entering the sales ring. Specifically, we use a binary logit model to identify relevant characteristics that affect a breeder’s decision to withdraw a sale eligible bull from the auction.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Breeder decisions; Livestock; Performance bull test; Agribusiness; Demand and Price Analysis; Livestock Production/Industries; Productivity Analysis; C31; D23; D44; D83; M31; Q13.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/47264
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Highway Franchising and Real Estate Values AgEcon
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander.
It has become increasingly common to allocate highway franchises to the bidder that offers to charge the lowest toll. Often, building a highway increases the value of land held by a small group of developers, an effect that is more pronounced with lower tolls. We study the welfare implications of highway franchises that benefit large developers, focusing on the incentives developers have to internalize the effect of the toll they bid on the value of their land. We study how participation by developers in the auction affects equilibrium tolls and welfare. We find that large developers bid more aggressively than construction companies that own no land. As long as land ownership is sufficiently concentrated, allowing developers in the auction leads to lower...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Demsetz auctions; Highway concessions; Private participation in infrastructure; Land Economics/Use; D44; H40; H54; R42; R48.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28523
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Unilateral and Exclusionary/Strategic Effects of Common Agency: Price Impacts in a Repeated Common Value English Auction AgEcon
Coatney, Kalyn T.; Shaffer, Sherrill L.; Menkhaus, Dale J.; Scheer, Jennifer L..
The business justification for multiple principals to hire a common agent is efficiency. Our empirical study demonstrates that the creation of the common agent unilaterally depresses winning bids. Additionally, the common agent was not only observed to be the dominant bidder but also paid significantly lower prices than fringe competitors (price/quantity differential). The observed price/quantity differential is consistent with the almost common value English auction theory developed by Rose and Kagel (2008) in which a cost advantaged bidder is able to reduce competition by credibly raising the costs of disadvantaged rivals associated with the winner’s curse.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Common Value Auctions; Common Agency; Antitrust; Industrial Organization; D44; K21; K23.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56529
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Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values AgEcon
Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram.
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96668
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Evaluating conservation auctions with limited information: the policy maker’s predicament AgEcon
Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.
Buying environmental services from private landholders using tendering mechanisms are usually subject to a budget constraint. Auction theory has mostly focused on target-constrained auctions and is less well developed for this type of auction. This paper examines a theoretical model specifically developed for budget-constrained tenders and assesses its capacity to predict tendering performance under information limitations typical of those found in field applications. But this assessment cannot be done without complementing the model with controlled laboratory experiments. Subject to their external validity, we find that the model is able to make the correct policy recommendation when comparing the tender to an equivalent fixed price scheme, even when the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100884
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Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping AgEcon
Albano, Gian Luigi; Cesi, Berardino.
When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Repeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy; Political Economy; C73; D82; D44; H57; K12; L14.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6370
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A Robust Multivariate Long Run Analysis of European Electricity Prices AgEcon
Bosco, Bruno; Parisio, Lucia; Pelagatti, Matteo; Baldi, Fabio.
This paper analyses the interdependencies existing in wholesale European electricity prices. The results of a multivariate long run dynamic analysis of weekly median prices reveal the presence of a strong although not perfect integration among some neighboring markets considered in the sample and the existence of common long-term dynamics of electricity prices and gas prices but not oil prices. The existence of long-term dynamics among gas prices and electricity prices may prove to be important for long-term hedging operations to be conducted even in markets where there are no electricity derivatives.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: European Electricity Prices; Cointegration; Interdependencies; Equilibrium Correction Model; Oil Prices; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C15; C32; D44; L94; Q40.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7438
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FOOD CHOICE, NUTRITIONAL INFORMATION AND FUNCTIONAL INGREDIENTS: AN EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION EMPLOYING BREAD AgEcon
Hellyer, Nicole Elizabeth; Fraser, Iain; Haddock-Fraser, Janet.
In this paper we present the results of an experimental auction conducted to examine the influence of nutritional information on food choice and in particular estimate consumer willingness to pay for bread that contains functional ingredients which is used to make sandwiches. We find that consumers are willing to pay more for a whole grain and whole grain granary bread sandwich than other bread types. We also find that consumers do react positively to the provision of nutritional and health benefit information but that this effect occurs regardless of whether we supply specific or nonspecific health benefit information. We discuss information provision and health policy implications that emerge from our analysis.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Functional foods; Bread; Willingness-to-pay; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Health Economics and Policy; D44; I1.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116424
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Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions AgEcon
Davis, David E..
State WIC agencies in infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. A theoretical model of rebates shows that bidders may shade their bids and extract surplus from agencies. An empirical estimation shows that bids are lower to alliances suggesting that alliances countervail the power of bidders to extract surplus.
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Food assistance; Countervailing power; Buyer concentration; Oligopoly; WIC.; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Industrial Organization; L13; D43; D44; Q18; I18.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123863
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Competition In or For the Field: Which Is Better? AgEcon
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander.
In many circumstances, a principal, who wants prices to be as low as possible, must contract with agents who would like to charge the monopoly price. This paper compares a Demsetz auction, which awards an exclusive contract to the agent bidding the lowest price (competition for the field) with having two agents provide the good under (imperfectly) competitive conditions (competition in the field). We obtain a simple sufficient condition showing unambiguously which option is best. The condition depends only on the shapes of the surplus function of the principal and the profit function of agents, and is independent of the particular duopoly game played ex post. We apply this condition to three canonical examples-procurement, royalty contracts and...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Demsetz auction; Double marginalization; Franchising; Joint vs. separate auctions; Monopoly; Procurement; Dealerships; Royalty contracts; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D44; L12; L92.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28406
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Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements AgEcon
Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele.
We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits; Public Economics; L51; D44; D92.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50409
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Initial Endowment Effects in Multi-Unit Vickrey Auctions AgEcon
Akaichi, Faiçal; Nayga, Rodolfo M., Jr.; Gil, Jose Maria.
We report the result of experiments designed to assess the effect of initial endowments on willingness to pay values elicited from multi-unit Vickrey auctions. Comparing bids from an “endow and upgrade” approach with the “full bidding” approach, we find that the direction of the endowment effect generally depends on the number of endowed units of the conventional product that subjects are willing to give up in exchange for units of the upgraded product. The endowment effect is “reverse” when the number of units that participants are willing to give up is lower or equal to the number of remaining endowed units. However, we generally find an endowment effect when the number of units a participant is willing to give up is higher than the number of remaining...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Endowment effect; Number of units of the endowed product; Multi-unit Vickrey auctions.; Agribusiness; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C91; D12; D44.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103041
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Results from the Farm Behaviour Component of the Integrated Economic-Hydrologic Model for the Watershed Evaluation of Beneficial Management Practices Program AgEcon
Boxall, Peter C.; Weber, Marian; Perger, Orsolya; Cutlac, Marius; Samarawickrema, Antony.
This report summarizes preliminary results from the Farm Behavior component of the South Tobacco Creek Integrated Modeling Project (STC Project) which is being undertaken as part of the Watershed Evaluation of BMPs (WEBs) Program. WEBS is a partnership between Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (DUC) established to evaluate the economic and environmental performance of BMPs for water quality at the watershed scale. Water draining from South Tobacco Creek eventually enters to Lake Winnipeg which is degraded from the cumulative effects of nutrient loading, particularly phosphorous. Many jurisdictions across the world, including Canada, use payments programs to encourage land owners to change land management practices in order...
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Watersheds South Tobacco Creek water quality Environmental Economics and Policy Land Economics/Use Resource /Energy Economics and Policy Q12; Q52; D44.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116268
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Buying Fields and Marrying Daughters: An Empirical Analysis of Rosca Auctions in a South Indian Village AgEcon
Klonner, Stefan.
A bidding rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is modeled as a sequence of symmetric-independent-private-value auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders. We estimate a structural econometric model which, by introducing an altruistic component into each bidder's utility function, allows for socially favorable deviations from the private information, non-altruistic bidding equilibrium. We find that bidding is more altruistic in groups managed by experienced organizers and in Roscas whose current members have already run through more than one Rosca cycle of the current group, implying that effective leadership and enduring relationships help mitigate the social cost of strategic behavior. When a bidder has to meet an unforeseen...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Roscas; Auctions; Consumer/Household Economics; D44; G20.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28449
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Conservation Auctions in Manitoba: A Summary of a Series of Workshops AgEcon
Packman, Katherine; Boxall, Peter C..
Currently, the effect of human impact on the environment is becoming increasingly apparent. The encroachment of human activity has inevitably resulted in the loss or impairment of ecological goods and services (EG&S) around the globe as well as in our own backyard. EG&S include features such as wildlife habitat, biodiversity, soil renewal, or nutrient cycling. The loss of such features has become a sobering reality for Manitobans in the face of the utrophication of Lake Winnipeg as a result of practices contributing to nutrient loading into the lake. Since EG&S are very important to Manitobans, efforts are being made to explore different vehicles to encourage their provision. In order to address some of the environmental issues transpiring in...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Market based instruments; Conservation auction; Tender; Wetland restoration; Environmental Economics and Policy; D44; Q20; Q57.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91423
Registros recuperados: 40
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