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Leveraging Landscape Change: Instrument design for supporting the evolution of new natural resource industry niches AgEcon
Hatfield-Dodds, Steve; Binning, Carl; Dyack, Brenda.
This paper outlines how resource degradation in Australia could be reversed with innovative investment approaches that compensate for the main impediments to beneficial landscape change. We argue that the existing suite of policy responses is incomplete and there are benefits to be had by introducing some new approaches for encouraging innovative and creative, appropriate landscape change. We discuss two examples that address the need for instruments that encourage the evolution of new natural resource industry niches: 1. the proposal advanced by the Allen Consulting Group in its recommendations to the Business Leaders Roundtable in 2001 on options for leveraging private investment entitled Repairing the Country 2. a pilot project that is being undertaken...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Q28; D7.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58704
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Handels- und Finanz- architektur im Umbruch: Globale Integration und die institutionelle Arbeitsteilung von IWF, Weltbank und WTO AgEcon
Hefeker, Carsten.
Das Papier untersucht die Rolle von IWF, Weltbank und WTO und ihre Arbeitsteilung. Ich diskutiere die Gründe für ihre Existenz und ihre ursprünglichen Aufgaben und frage, inwieweit es ihnen gelungen ist, sich den veränderten Bedingungen und ihren neuen Aufgaben anzupassen. Politisch-ökonomische Überlegungen demonstrieren, dass die Organisationen ihren Eigennutz maximieren, andererseits aber auch als Instrument der Mitgliedsländer missbraucht werden. Dies erklärt, warum die Organisationen nicht immer erfolgreich gewesen sind. Mögliche Vorschläge für eine Reform warden diskutiert.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Internationale Organisationen; Bürokratietheorie; Handels- und Finanzarchitektur.; Financial Economics; D7; F0; F10; F3.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26158
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What Determines the Economic Links among Organic Farmers? Empirical Evidence from Argentina AgEcon
Casellas, Karina S.; Berges, Miriam E.; Cala, Daniela.
Farming and consumers` decisions are affected by markets globalizations, products differentiation, agricultural industrialization at the retail level and new organizational forms. The linkages among farmers emerge as a viable strategy to compete in this new context. Producers must develop skills to maintain market positioning and access to high value added niches. In Argentina, organic production has been an alternative for farmers to increase revenues, since the nineties, due to the major demand of developed countries and the price premiums. The objective of the paper is to investigate the extent to which Argentinian organic producers operate in an associated way and which the determinants of these linkages are. A count model regression is used to...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Horizontal Links; Organic producers; Count Model; Farm Management; D7; C21.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25651
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GOVERNMENT VS. ANARCHY: MODELING THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS AgEcon
Mittenzwei, Klaus; Bullock, David S..
This paper gives a general mathematical definition of an institution, and presents an explicit formal method by which to incorporate institutions in a standard general equilibrium model. We illustrate our concept using a modified Prisoner's dilemma game in which property rights over natural resources emerge from an anarchy-like state of nature. Two players decide voluntarily and non-cooperatively whether to give up some fraction of their personal resource to set up an enforcement mechanism that punishes defecting players (i.e., players that do not opt to cooperate). This enforcement mechanism constitutes a credible threat, and is central to the establishment of bilateral cooperation (i.e, government). We highlight the importance of imperfect...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Institutions; Imperfect Information; Property Rights; Decision Making; Social Games; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C72; D7; D81.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21496
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Seasoning a Monopsonic Processor for Collective Action amongst Pepper Producers in Costa Rica AgEcon
Saenz-Segura, Fernando J.F.; Schipper, Robert A.; D'Haese, Marijke F.C..
The small-scale pepper producers in the El Roble settlement Costa Rica face a monopsonistic market. Only one processing firm is buying the fresh pepper bunches. The processor has all bargaining power to decide on the price paid to the farmers and the quality selection criteria. The rejection rates are high, which is why farmers decided to market their pepper collectively. They started organizing the selection and transport of pepper and entered into group contracts with the firm. We use a non-linear integer simulation model to predict the price level and contractual form (individual or group contracts) which maximises the income of the firm and farmers under three conditions, namely, monopsony (firm holds all bargaining power), monopoly (producers hold all...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Collective action; Contracts; Institutional development; Costa Rica; Pepper; Agribusiness; Crop Production/Industries; O2; Q13; D4; D7.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25789
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The Response of Consumption to Income Shocks: Evidence from the Indian Trade Liberalization AgEcon
Tandon, Sharad; Landes, Maurice R..
This paper uses the Indian tariff reforms of the early nineties to estimate how households responded to the negative income shocks caused by the tariff decreases. Households more hurt by the tariff reform decreased overall expenditure, but the response is not uniform across food items. In particular, households more hurt by the reform did not change their consumption of cereals, but decreased their consumption of all other food items. Although this coping mechanism helped maintain overall levels of calorie consumption, diet diversity and the associated benefits were sacrificed.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Nutrition; Trade; Development; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; International Development; D7; D8; H2; O2.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103767
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Decision Support Systems in Australian Agriculture: State of the Art and Future Development AgEcon
Nguyen, Nam C.; Wegener, Malcolm K.; Russell, Iean W..
This paper reports and discusses the results of a survey conducted with experts working in the field of decision support systems (DSS) in Australian agriculture. It also reviews the literature on DSS in the light of these experts' responses. The findings from this survey have consolidated our understanding of the current state of DSS in Australian agriculture. The uptake of DSS by farmers has been slow and various issues said to be contributing to this include fear of using computers, time constraints, poor marketing, complexity, lack of local relevance, lack of end-user involvement, and mismatched objectives between developers and users. The future prospect for the development of DSS was generally regarded to be poor. Never-the-less, the authors believe...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: DSS; Farmers' decision-making; Expert opinion; Management decisions; Farm Management; D7; D8; Q12; Q13; Q16.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25581
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One Player Games versus Two Player Games: Comparing Agribusiness Cooperatives with Investor-Owned Business Models AgEcon
Parker, Frederick.
Cooperative business firms are prevalent in agribusiness, yet no concise generalized model exists to demonstrate how and why cooperative firms differ from, and may be selected over, the more common investor owned business firm. It is shown within a generic transaction game that cooperatives fill both producer and consumer roles as an aggregated player that is expected to maximize aggregate producer and consumer payoffs rather than maximizing either payoff separately, which contrasts with investor owned firms as essentially two player games between separate and competing producers and consumers where each player seeks to maximize their separate payoff individually. A cardinally valued game theoretic matrix is used to demonstrate the expected differences...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Game Theory; Collective Action; Agricultural Economics; Theory of the Firm; Agribusiness; B5; C7; D7; L2; L3; Q1.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100691
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1996 PRICING PERFORMANCE OF MARKET ADVISORY SERVICES FOR CORN AND SOYBEANS AgEcon
Jackson, Thomas E.; Irwin, Scott H.; Good, Darrel L..
The purpose of this research report is to present an evaluation of advisory service pricing performance in 1996 for corn and soybeans. Specifically, the average price received by a subscriber to an advisory service is calculated for corn and soybean crops harvested in 1996. The average net advisory price across all 26 corn programs is $2.63 per bushel. The range of net advisory prices for corn is quite large, with a minimum of $2.08 per bushel and a maximum of $3.12 per bushel. The average net advisory price across all 24 soybean programs is $7.27 per bushel. As with corn, the range of net advisory prices for soybeans is substantial, with a minimum of $6.80 per bushel and a maximum of $7.80 per bushel.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Agricultural Market Advisory Services; G1; D8; D7; D4; G2; H4; H8; Q1; Z1; Marketing.
Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14787
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Weaknesses in Institutional Organization: Explaining the Dismal Performance of Kenya's Coffee Cooperatives AgEcon
Mude, Andrew G..
In this paper, we use the experience of Kenya's failing Coffee Cooperatives to show that, under certain circumstances, membership based organizations can give rise to perverse incentives that undermine the benefits of organizing and lead to a reduction in member productivity and welfare. We identify certain features of the institutional environment underlying Kenya's coffee cooperatives that facilitate rent-seeking behavior. The lack of a formal regulatory structure with credible enforcement mechanisms, the presence of informal electoral practices conducive to vote-buying, and the legal support for local monopsonies that facilitates exploitive pricing all contribute to the dismal performance of Kenya's coffee cooperatives. Using a data set of more than 200...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agricultural Cooperatives; Decentralization; Rent-Seeking; Technical Inefficiency; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; D7; Q13; Q18; Z13.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25306
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Punish and Perish? AgEcon
Antoci, Angelo; Zarri, Luca.
The evolution of large-scale cooperation among genetic strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown that so called ‘strong reciprocity’ plays a key role in accounting for the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar as strongly reciprocal players are willing to costly sanction defectors, cooperation flourishes. However, experimental evidence unambiguously indicates that not only defection and strong reciprocity, but also unconditional cooperation is a quantitatively important behavioral attitude. By referring to a prisoner’s dilemma framework where punishment (‘stick’) and rewarding (‘carrot’) options are available, here we show analytically that the presence of cooperators who...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Altruistic Punishment; Altruistic Rewarding; Heterogeneous Types; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C7; D7; Z1.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115847
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1995 PRICING PERFORMANCE OF MARKET ADVISORY SERVICES FOR CORN AND SOYBEANS AgEcon
Jackson, Thomas E.; Irwin, Scott H.; Good, Darrel L..
The purpose of this research report is to present an evaluation of advisory service pricing performance in 1995 for corn and soybeans. Specifically, the average price received by a subscriber to an advisory service is calculated for corn and soybean crops harvested in 1995. The average net advisory price across all 25 corn programs is $3.04 per bushel. The range of net advisory prices for corn is quite large, with a minimum of $2.34 per bushel and a maximum of $3.81 per bushel. The average net advisory price across all 25 soybean programs is $6.61 per bushel. As with corn, the range of net advisory prices for soybeans is substantial, with a minimum of $5.75 per bushel and a maximum of $7.92 per bushel.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project; D4; D7; D8; G1; G2; H4; H8; Q1; Z1; Marketing.
Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14790
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Do Ideas Matter in Strategic Choices Made by Organizations? An Empirical Work on the Participation of Agricultural Organizations to the Political Making Process in Costa Rica AgEcon
D'Hotel, Elodie Maitre; le Cotty, Tristan.
The new institutional economics has recently developed the idea that the institutional environment can have an impact on economic actors' mental perceptions, and reciprocally, that these perceptions can impact on the institutional environment. This latter point seems particularly relevant in the field of economic organisations participation in the political making process. Nevertheless the empirical description of this role of mental perceptions in the political behaviour had not been made clearly. To contribute to this empirical description we lead a comparative study of 4 farm sectors in Costa Rica, based on a dynamic approach of mental perceptions in relation with the institutional change occurring during the liberalisation process. We carry out a...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Political Economy; D7; N5; Z0.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25792
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Social Capital and Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe Toward An Analytical Framework AgEcon
Murray, Catherine.
The transition process in central and eastern Europe (CEE) had a profound effect on how individuals interact. Economic and social institutions have changed, requiring an adaptation process by individuals in the move toward a market economy. How each individual accesses, manipulates and uses their networks will determine the use of their social capital. Within CEE, there is a presumption of low levels of social capital. This paper was written as a conceptual framework for a research project entitled 'Integrated Development of Agricultural and Rural Institutions' (IDARI) in CEE countries. The paper exposes the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behaviour in light of rural restructuring and institutional change in CEE. A link exists between social...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Z13; D7.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25647
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