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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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| Ando, Amy Whritenour. |
| This paper conducts a test of the hypothesis that interest groups compete strategically for influence with a policy-making agency. It adapts econometric methodology from the empirical industrial organization literature that was designed to work with discrete game-theoretic models, and uses data on whether or not supporting and opposing interest groups submitted comments to the Fish and Wildlife Service about each of 173 proposals to add new species to the endangered species list. The results imply that groups do respond to variations in the expected costs and benefits of a listing when deciding whether to pressure the agency. There is no support, however, for the hypothesis that the levels of pressure exerted by the groups emerge from the Nash equilibrium... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Interest groups; Strategic competition; Empirical game theory; Endangered species; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C25; C72; D72; Q28. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10732 |
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| Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, Marc. |
| Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coalition; Fallback Process; Kingmaker Leader; Cardinally Single-peaked; Ordinally Single-peaked; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C71; C78; D72. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52337 |
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| Boyd, James; Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| The paper evaluates the desirability of compensation for regulatory takings. To do so, we describe a public choice model in which regulators' decisions are influenced by competing political interests. We consider how the political incentives of landowners, environmentalists, and taxpayers are affected by alternative compensation rules and in turn describe the regulatory decisions made in such a pluralistic political environment. Modeling the regulator's incentives in this way leads to the conclusion that compensation should not be paid unless environmentalists and property owners have unequal influence politically. Moreover, the model has several counter-intuitive implications when political influence is not balanced. For instance, if environmentalists are... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Regulatory takings; Compensation; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; K11; D72; L51. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10702 |
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| Blomberg, S. Brock; Frieden, Jeffry; Stein, Ernesto. |
| Government exchange rate regime choice is constrained by both political and economic factors. One political factor is the role of special interests: the larger the tradable sectors exposed to international competition, the less likely is the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate regime. Another political factor is electoral: as an election approaches, the probability of the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate increases. We test these arguments with hazard models to analyze the duration dependence of Latin American exchange rate arrangements from 1960 to 1999. We find substantial empirical evidence for these propositions. Results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of other economic and political variables, to different time and country samples, and to... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Exchange rates; Elections; D72; F31. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37097 |
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| Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A.. |
| Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D64; D72; H41. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51132 |
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| Canton, Joan. |
| In this partial equilibrium and static model, the impact of environmentalism on two countries' environmental policies is presented. First, the only (indirect) way environmentalists influence the choice of pollution taxes is through a negative term in the welfare function in Home. It is defined as passive environmentalism (PE). Second, this article is a first attempt to consider domestic environmentalists lobbying a foreign government. It is defined as active environmentalism (AE). Our contribution is threefold. We emphasize first that the way environmentalists act is paramount to study the consequences of their actions. Passive or active environmentalisms have very different impacts on environmental policies. Second, we show that lobbying activities can be... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmentalism; Lobby Groups; Positive Environmental Economics; Strategic Environmental Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; D72. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54303 |
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| Cook, Michael L.; Plunkett, Brad. |
| This paper introduces and defines the concept of collective entrepreneurship. A review of the defensive single-level rent-seeking objective of traditional agricultural cooperatives is introduced followed by an analysis of recent studies documenting a shift in the objective functions of producers jointly integrating toward more multiple-level rent-seeking entities. This process of shifting from market failure-ameliorating collective action mechanisms toward rent-seeking group action organizations is labeled collective entrepreneurship. The justification for introducing this concept is based on the Olsonian premise that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests without coercion or selective incentives. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural cooperatives; Entrepreneurship; Agribusiness; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Labor and Human Capital; D23; D72; Q13. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43777 |
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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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