Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (32) Autor Pin, Paolo (4) Kinateder, Markus (3) Golub, Benjamin (2) Jackson, Matthew O. (2) Mengel, Friederike (2) Agbaglah, Messan (1) Boncinelli, Leonardo (1) Buchenrieder, Gertrud (1) Buechel, Berno (1) Buskens, Vincent (1) Chen, Xi (1) Conley, Timothy G. (1) Dall'Asta, Luca (1) Dooan, Gonul (1) Dufhues, Thomas (1) Ehlers, Lars (1) Fischer, Isabel (1) Fosco, Constanza (1) Franz, Silvio (1) Gallo, Edoardo (1) Mais... Palavra-chave D85 (32) C72 (13) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (12) Networks (8) Environmental Economics and Policy (7) C73 (5) Network Formation (5) Social Networks (5) Network (4) Z13 (4) C92 (3) Community/Rural/Urban Development (3) D83 (3) Efficiency (3) Game Theory (3) H41 (3) L14 (3) Nash Equilibrium (3) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (3) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (3) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (28) Conference Paper or Presentation (3) Working Paper (1) Ano 2011 (5) 2010 (7) 2009 (9) 2008 (6) 2007 (3) 2006 (1) 2004 (1) Mais... País United States (32) Idioma Inglês (32)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 32 Primeira ... 1 2 ... Última SOCIAL CAPITAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CURRENT STATE OF THE ART AgEcon Dufhues, Thomas; Buchenrieder, Gertrud; Fischer, Isabel. Social capital has been recently held up as a conceptual framework to build a bridge between the diverse disciplines involved in rural development. However, despite its potential and the impressively rapid take-up of the concept by the community of development professionals, it remains an elusive construct. No definition is yet generally accepted and many definitions are in use. Recently, social capital in the form of social networks has gained much attention in rural development theory and empirical research. But social networks or structural components of social capital are a largely missing dimension in income and poverty analysis. Moreover, most research on social capital assumes that it is a uniform entity. Therefore, the effects of different forms of... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Sozialkapital; Individuelles Sozialkapital; Sozialkapitalmessung; Ego-zentriertes Netzwerk; Soziale Netzwerke; Social capital; Individual social capital; Measuring social capital; Ego-network; Social networks; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Labor and Human Capital; D85; Z13. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92017 In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents AgEcon Ule, Aljaz; Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno. This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. Furthermore, agents' types may be common knowledge or private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. With homogeneous agents, equilibrium predictions fail completely. In contrast, with heterogeneous agents stars frequently occur, often with the high-value or low-cost agent in the center. Stars are not born but rather develop: with a high-value agent, the network's centrality, stability, and efficiency all... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Experiment; Heterogeneity; Private Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C92; D82; D85. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9099 A Network Model of Price Dispersion AgEcon Pasini, Giacomo; Pin, Paolo; Weidenholzer, Simon. We analyze a model of price competition a la Bertrand in a network environment. Firms only have a limited information on the structure of network: they know the number of potential customers they can attract and the degree distribution of customers. This incomplete information framework stimulates the use of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We find that, if there are customers only linked to one firm, but not all of them are, then an equilibrium in randomized strategies fails to exist. Instead, we find a symmetric equilibrium in randomized strategies. Finally, we test our results on US gasoline data. We find empirical evidence consistent with firms playing random strategies. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Bertrand Competition; Bayesian- Nash Equilibrium; Mobility Index; Demand and Price Analysis; D43; D85; L11. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6230 Diffusion of Innovations on Community Based Small Worlds: the Role of Correlation between Social Spheres AgEcon Tanimura, Emily. Which types of networks favor the diffusion of innovations in the sense that an innovation whose intrinsic benefits are greater than those of an established choice will be able to replace the latter when it is initially used only by a small fraction of a large population? For deterministic and regular networks there are characterizations, based on a coordination game model of the diffusion of innovations. Here we study this question for a class of irregular random networks, Small world networks, which are of interest as more realistic models of social networks. We consider a random graph model based on a community structure, in which the choice of a parameter allows us to obtain as special cases several well known models, in particular Watts' Small world.... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Diffusion of innovations; Small World Networks; Contagion Threshold; Community Structure; Social Networks; Environmental Economics and Policy; D85. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96842 Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network AgEcon Richefort, Lionel; Point, Patrick. A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France). Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Common-pool Resource; Digraph; Cycle; Independent Set; Empirical Example; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; D85; H41. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98470 Team Formation in a Network AgEcon Kinateder, Markus. Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent’s expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation. A social planner frequently would achieve a higher welfare. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Dynamic Competitive Group Formation; Imperfect Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C73; D85. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50722 Small World Networks with Segregation Patterns and Brokers AgEcon Gallo, Edoardo. Many social networks have the following properties: (i) a short average distance between any two individuals; (ii) a high clustering coefficient; (iii) segregation patterns; the presence of (iv) brokers and (v) hubs. (i) and (ii) define a small world network. This paper develops a strategic network formation model where agents have heterogeneous knowledge of the network: cognizant agents know the whole network, while ignorant ones are less knowledgeable. For a broad range of parameters, all pairwise Nash (PN) networks have properties (i)-(iv). There are some PN networks with one hub. Cognizant agents have higher betweenness centrality: they are the brokers who connect different parts of the network. Ignorant agents cause the emergence of segregation... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Network; Cognitive Network; Small World; Broker; Segregation; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; D85. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50712 How Homophily Affects Learning and Diffusion in Networks AgEcon Golub, Benjamin; Jackson, Matthew O.. We examine how three different communication processes operating through social networks are affected by homophily - the tendency of individuals to associate with others similar to themselves. Homophily has no effect if messages are broadcast or sent via shortest paths; only connection density matters. In contrast, homophily substantially slows learning based on repeated averaging of neighbors' information and Markovian diffusion processes such as the Google random surfer model. Indeed, the latter processes are strongly affected by homophily but completely independent of connection density, provided this density exceeds a low threshold. We obtain these results by establishing new results on the spectra of large random graphs and relating the spectra to... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Networks; Learning; Diffusion; Homophily; Friendships; Social Networks; Random Graphs; Mixing Time; Convergence; Speed of Learning; Speed of Convergence; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; D83; D85; I21; J15; Z13. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50718 Social Networks in Ghana AgEcon Udry, Christopher R.; Conley, Timothy G.. In this chapter we examine social networks among farmers in a developing country. We use detailed data on economic activities and social interactions between people living in four study villages in Ghana. It is clear that economic development in this region is being shaped by the networks of information, capital and influence that permeate these communities. This chapter explores the determinants of these important economic networks. We first describe the patterns of information, capital, labor and land transaction connections that are apparent in these villages. We then discuss the interconnections between the various economic networks. We relate the functional economic networks to more fundamental social relationships between people in a reduced form... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Endogenous networks; Informal credit; Social learning; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; O12; D85. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28488 Opportunity and Choice in Social Networks AgEcon Pin, Paolo; Franz, Silvio; Marsili, Matteo. Our societies are heterogeneous in many dimensions such as census, education, religion, ethnic and cultural composition. The links between individuals - e.g. by friendship, marriage or collaboration - are not evenly distributed, but rather tend to be concentrated within the same group. This phenomenon, called imbreeding homophily, has been related to either (social) preference for links with own--type individuals ( choice-based homophily) or to the prevalence of individuals of her same type in the choice set of an individual ( opportunity-based homophily). We propose an indicator to distinguish between these effects for minority groups. This is based on the observation that, in environments with unbiased opportunities, as the relative size of the minority... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Social Networks; Choice-Based and Opportunity-Based Homophily; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D85; J11; J12. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6232 Rural networks in the funding period 2007-2013: A critical review of the EU policy instrument. AgEcon Marquardt, Doris. Rural Networks have been implemented as an instrument to enhance EU rural development policies in the funding period 2007-2013. Gaps in European programme documents concerning the networks’ purpose and their evaluation led to a survey of the National Network Units being conducted in 2010. Besides investigating how these gaps are bridged nationally, the survey aimed to provide an overview of the development of the networks, of the initial experiences and challenges faced in running the networks, and to assess their potential impact. Empirical findings show that the networks probably support rural development (policies) and create added value. However, ways of demonstrating this impact in quantitative terms are lacking. Member states tend to stick closely to... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: National Rural Networks; Policy Instrument; Rural Development; CAP; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Community/Rural/Urban Development; International Development; Land Economics/Use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q18; D85. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/109517 (Anti-) Coordination in Networks AgEcon Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, Jose Gabriel. We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Networks; Coordination Problems; Experiments; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; C90; C91; D85. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61370 Does Network Matter in International Expansion? Evidence from Italian SMEs AgEcon Petruzzellis, Luca; Gurrieri, Antonia Rosa. In order to face the new competitive scenario, Apulian textile firms are involved in a process of change and are trying to adopt a networking approach in analysing the international propensity of SMEs. The case of the textile network in Apulia has been analysed using a semi-structured questionnaire submitted to a sample of family businesses in order to verify the influence of network on their internationalisation process. The contribution that the network can give to the single firm in its internationalisation process depends also on the level of cooperation in the network. In fact, relationships – at least dual vertical relationships – are the key to overcoming size limit and providing value to all the partners involved. The research attempted to offer a... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Internationalisation Strategies; Network Approach; L2; D85. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42918 Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism AgEcon Patacchini, Eleonora; Zenou, Yves. This paper studies whether conformism behavior affects individual outcomes in crime. We present a social network model of peer effects with ex-ante heterogeneous agents and show how conformism and deterrence affect criminal activities. We then bring the model to the data by using a very detailed dataset of adolescent friendship networks. A novel social network-based empirical strategy allows us to identify peer effects for different types of crimes. We find that conformity plays an important role for all crimes, especially for petty crimes. This suggests that, for juvenile crime, an effective policy should not only be measured by the possible crime reduction it implies but also by the group interactions it engenders. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Social Networks; Linear-in-means Model; Spatial Autoregressive Model; Social Norms; Labor and Human Capital; A14; C21; D85; K42; Z13. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90945 Under-connected and Over-connected Networks AgEcon Buechel, Berno; Hellmann, Tim. Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically are the sources of inefficiency. We approach this omission by analyzing the role of positive and negative externalities of link formation. This yields general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be “too dense” in a well-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities tend to induce “too dense” networks. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Networks; Network Formation; Connections; Game Theory; Externalities; Spillovers; Stability; Efficiency; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; D85; C72; L14. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50728 Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks AgEcon Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars. This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Overlapping Coalitions; Cover Function; Bargaining; Symmetric Game; Network; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; C78; D62; D85. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96628 Power in the Heterogeneous Connections Model: The Emergence of Core-Periphery Networks AgEcon Persitz, Dotan. The heterogeneous connections model is a generalization of the homogeneous connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in which the intrinsic value of each connection is set by a discrete, positive and symmetric function that depends solely on the types of the two end agents. Core periphery networks are defined as networks in which the agents' set can be partitioned into two subsets, one in which the members are completely connected among themselves and the other where there are no internal links. A two-type society is defined as "power based" if both types of agents prefer to connect to one of the types over the other, controlling for path length. An exhaustive analysis shows that core periphery networks, in which the "preferred" types are in the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Heterogeneity; Pairwise Stability; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; D85; L14. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52338 Motives for sharing in social networks AgEcon Ligon, Ethan; Schechter, Laura. What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using a standard, anonymous dictator game. Then using variants of the dictator game that allow for either revealing the dictator's identity or allowing the dictator to choose the recipient, we attribute variation in sharing to three different motives. The first of these, directed altruism, is related to preferences, while the remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). We observe high average levels of sharing in our baseline treatment, while variation across individuals depends importantly on the incentive-related motives. Finally, variation in measured reciprocity within the experiment predicts observed `real-world' gift-giving, while... Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development; Political Economy; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C92; C93; D03; D64; D85; O17. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120376 Repeated Games Played in a Network AgEcon Kinateder, Markus. Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. Due to this and the bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also produces a network result; namely,... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Repeated Game; Delayed Perfect Monitoring; Network; Communication; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C73; D85. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6377 Network of Commons AgEcon Ylkilic, Rahmi. A tragedy of the commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide how much resource to draw from each source they are connected to. We show that if the value of the resource to the users is linear, then each resource exhibits an isolated problem. There exists a unique equilibrium. But when the users have concave values, the network structure matters. The exploitation at each source depends on the centrality of the links connecting the source to the users. The equilibrium is unique and we provide a formula which expresses the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Tragedy of the Commons; Networks; Nash Equilibrium; Efficiency; Centrality Measures; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C62; C72; D85; Q20. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6221 Registros recuperados: 32 Primeira ... 1 2 ... Última

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco