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| Registros recuperados: 19 | |
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| Brown, Zachary S.; Bellemare, Marc F.. |
| We develop a method to structurally estimate principal-agent models by ordinary least squares (OLS). We set up a general principal-agent model which explicitly incorporates the wealth levels of each party and the opportunity cost to the agent of entering the contract. This yields an optimal contract that is linearized by way of an Nth order Taylor approximation. This in turn imposes N(3N-1)/2 restrictions on the parameters and yields an empirical test of the canonical principal-agent model. In the application, we consider the case where N = 2 and apply our method to a sample of land tenancy contracts in rural Madagascar. Empirical tests lead to consistent failure to reject the hypotheses derived from our structural model, which lends support to our... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Principal-Agent Models; Contract Theory; Structural Estimations; Risk and Uncertainty; C12; C13; D86; O12; Q12. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49368 |
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| Sampaio, Luciano Menezes Bezerra. |
| Fruit production is an activity of great importance in the Brazilian commercial balance and even more in the Northeastern region. Intermediation is a regular practice in the fruit exporting market due to existence of requirements, such as quality certificates, and of internal problems in production and commercialization, such as credit limitations and absence of product standardization. Large companies, cooperatives, associations and NGOs receive products from many small producers and export them together with their own products. In Northeast, it is common that the exporting agent offers contracts to producers that include technical, administrative and legal assistance plus input supply. This paper proposes a model, using the principal-agent approach of... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Game theory; Small producers; Irrigated fruit production; Exportation; Agribusiness; Q10; Q12; D86. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61921 |
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| Bontems, Philippe. |
| We explore in this paper the consequences of status seeking preferences among agents contracting with a private principal in the context of production. We examine in particular the case of envy and we show that in general envy entails augmented distortions due to asymmetric information in optimal contracts. Furthermore if the principal neglects the preferences of the agents with respect to status, then potentially there is under-participation to the contract. We also show that if the principal is free to choose who can participate to the contract, then under some conditions the principal may prefer to contract with only a subset of potentially "profitable" agents (that is where his utility is strictly positive). We then ask whether contracting with agents... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Status; Adverse selection; Contracts; Envy; Externalities; Production Economics; D6; H0; D86. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49507 |
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| Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto. |
| Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Procurement Auctions; Scoring Rules; IT Contracts; Price/Quality Ratio; Demand and Price Analysis; D44; D86; H51; H57. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46547 |
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| Hipp, Janie S.; Francis, Harriet F.. |
| Agriculture has seen a steady movement toward the increased use of contracts. Agricultural contracts now guide the interrelationships of parties throughout the modern production system, extending well beyond the livestock sector. With this predominance come new issues that require us to reexamine contract theory and the roles of the parties. This review examines legislation, regulations, and recent court rulings in seemingly unrelated areas that have specific relationships to the development of contracts in production agriculture: environmental law and labor law. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contracting; Environment; Labor; Law; Liability; Relationships; Risk; D23; D86; K12; K31; K32. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43508 |
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| Hiller, Timo. |
| This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash equilibria are of two types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second, asymmetric equilibria, such that agents can be partitioned into sets of different size, where agents within the same set are allies and agents in different sets are enemies. These results stand in contrast to coalition formation games in the economics of conflict literature, where stable group structures are generally symmetric.... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Economics of Conflict; Contest Success Function; Structural Balance; International Relations; Environmental Economics and Policy; D86; D74. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108251 |
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| Registros recuperados: 19 | |
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