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Calcott, Paul; Walls, Margaret. |
Several studies that have solved for optimal solid waste policy instruments have suggested that transaction costs may often prevent the working of recycling markets. In this paper, we explicitly incorporate such costs into a general equilibrium model of production, consumption, recycling, and disposal. Specifically, we assume that consumers have access to both recycling without payment and recycling with payment but that the latter option comes with transaction costs. Producers choose material and nonmaterial inputs to produce a consumer product, and they also choose design attributes of that product-its weight and degree of recyclability. We find that the policy instruments that yield a social optimum in this setting need to vary with the degree of... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Dfe; Deposit-refund; Disposal fee; Constrained optimum; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; Q28. |
Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10900 |
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