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| Tennbakk, Berit. |
| Over production is a persistent and costly problem in Norwegian agriculture. Support to agricultural production implicitly yields incentives to produce too much, i.e., causing market prices to fall below the target level, and thereby increasing the need for subsidies and additional market interventions. In order to restrict supplies, farmers are allowed to coordinate through marketing cooperatives. The paper argues that this coordination is likely to be insufficient in markets where the cooperative competes with an investor-owned wholesaler. Interventions in the market in order to remove excess supplies may induce further incentives to increase production. Levying a tax on all production in order to cover market regulation costs, moves the solution in the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Regulation; Over production; Duopoly; Agribusiness; Q13; L21; D43. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24907 |
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| Hendrikse, George W.J.; Hu, Yamei. |
| Various studies show that agricultural cooperatives behave differently than their investor-owned counterparts. One explanation may be that the internal decision making process differs in these two governance structures. A model is developed to explore how endogenous screening rules affect efficient organizational choices and industrial structures. It is shown that screening level choice may outweigh architecture choice and that screening rules are strategic substitutes. Conditions are derived under which cooperatives are efficient organizational forms. It is also shown that competition may increase the attractiveness of investor-owned firms and circumstances are determined in which cooperatives and investor owned firms coexist in equilibrium. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Architecture; Screening; Cooperatives; Duopoly; Agribusiness; Q13. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24522 |
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