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| Chomitz, Kenneth M; World Bank; kchomitz@worldbank.org; da Fonseca, Gustavo A. B.; Conservation International; g.fonseca@conservation.org; Alger, Keith; Conservation International; k.alger@conservation.org; Stoms, David M; University of California, Santa Barbara; stoms@bren.ucsb.edu; Landau, Elena Charlotte; Federal University of Minas Gerais; landau@icb.ufmg.br; Thomas, Timothy S.; World Bank; tthomas2@worldbank.org; Thomas, W. Wayt; New York Botanical Gardens; wthomas@nybg.org; Davis, Frank; University of California, Santa Barbara; fd@bren.ucsb.edu. |
| Conservation in densely settled biodiversity hotspots often requires setting up reserve networks that maintain sufficient contiguous habitat to support viable species populations. Because it is difficult to secure landholder compliance with a tightly constrained reserve network design, attention has shifted to voluntary incentive mechanisms, such as purchase of conservation easements by reverse auction or through a fixed-price offer. These mechanisms carry potential advantages of transparency, simplicity, and low cost. However, uncoordinated individual response to these incentives has been assumed incompatible with the conservation goal of viability, which depends on contiguous habitat and biodiversity representation. We model such incentives for southern... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Reports |
Palavras-chave: Bahia; Biodiversity; Conservation; Conservation planning; Economic instruments; Land use.. |
| Ano: 2006 |
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