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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Chowdhury, Shyamal K. (1) Guerriero, Carmine (1) Shu, Youhua (1) Palavra-chave Election (2) Agency (1) Electricity (1) Elite capture (1) Fiscal decentralization (1) H7 (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Judges (1) K23 (1) L51 (1) Political Economy (1) Public Economics (1) Q43 (1) R5 (1) Regulation (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2009 (1) 2008 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory and Evidence AgEcon Guerriero, Carmine. Revised version of paper added 01/16/09 Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Election; Agency; Judges; Regulation; Electricity; K23; L51; Q43. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37849 Does election lead to populism or elite capture in rural China AgEcon Shu, Youhua; Chowdhury, Shyamal K.. The nature of the collective ownership may make it easier for the local governments to purse private benefits from the return of the public investments on the collective operation. This may lead to disproportionate allocation of public funds to favour collective-owned operation as opposed to private production, though such allocation did not always benefit the majority of the villagers. The introduction of election in local governments may decrease the extent of her capture from public investments on the collective, for the reason that the village head needs to take not only the private interest but also the votes into her consideration when allocating the public funds. In this paper, we found evidence that the allocation of the public funds is sensitive... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Fiscal decentralization; Election; Elite capture; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy; Public Economics; H7; R5. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51405 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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