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| Blomberg, S. Brock; Frieden, Jeffry; Stein, Ernesto. |
| Government exchange rate regime choice is constrained by both political and economic factors. One political factor is the role of special interests: the larger the tradable sectors exposed to international competition, the less likely is the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate regime. Another political factor is electoral: as an election approaches, the probability of the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate increases. We test these arguments with hazard models to analyze the duration dependence of Latin American exchange rate arrangements from 1960 to 1999. We find substantial empirical evidence for these propositions. Results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of other economic and political variables, to different time and country samples, and to... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Exchange rates; Elections; D72; F31. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37097 |
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| Luo, Renfu; Zhang, Linxiu; Huang, Jikun; Rozelle, Scott. |
| A key issue in political economy concerns the accountability that governance structures impose on public officials and how elections and representative democracy influences the allocation of public resources. In this paper we exploit a unique survey data set from nearly 2450 randomly selected villages describing China’s recent progress in village governance reforms and its relationship to the provision of public goods in rural China between 1998 and 2004. Two sets of questions are investigated using an empirical framework based on a theoretical model in which local governments must decide to allocate fiscal resources between public goods investments and other expenditures. First, we find evidence—both in descriptive and econometric analyses—that when the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Democratization; Elections; Public goods; Rural China; Political Economy; Public Economics; H41; H54; H71. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50143 |
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