Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (6) Autor Stranlund, John K. (6) Chavez, Carlos A. (3) Villena, Mauricio G. (1) Zhang, Wei (1) Palavra-chave Emissions Taxes (6) Environmental Economics and Policy (6) L51 (6) Public Economics (5) Q58 (4) Uncertainty (4) Q28 (3) Risk and Uncertainty (3) Compliance (2) Enforcement (2) Monitoring (2) Administrative Costs (1) Asymmetric Information (1) Bankruptcy (1) Emissions Trading (1) Hybrid Emissions Control (1) Incomplete Information (1) Limited Liability (1) Pigouvian Taxes (1) Pollution Control (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (6) Ano 2011 (1) 2010 (1) 2009 (1) 2008 (2) 2007 (1) País United States (6) Idioma Inglês (6)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última A Note on Emissions Taxes and Incomplete Information AgEcon Chavez, Carlos A.; Stranlund, John K.. In contrast with what we perceive is the conventional wisdom about setting emissions taxes under uncertainty, we demonstrate that setting a uniform tax equal to expected marginal damage is not generally efficient under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs and damages from pollution. We show that efficient taxes will deviate from expected marginal damage if there is uncertainty about the slopes of the marginal abatement costs of regulated firms. Moreover, efficient emissions tax rates will vary across firms if a regulator can use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about how the firms’ marginal abatement costs vary. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emissions Taxes; Incomplete Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; Q28. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42129 A Safety Valve for Emissions Trading AgEcon Stranlund, John K.. This paper considers the optimal design of an emissions trading program that includes a safety valve tax that allows pollution sources to escape the emissions cap imposed by the aggregate supply of emissions permits. I demonstrate that an optimal hybrid emissions trading/emissions tax policy involves a permit supply that is strictly less than under a pure emissions trading scheme and a safety valve tax that exceeds the optimal pure emissions tax as long as expected marginal damage is an increasing function. While the expected level of emissions under a hybrid policy may be more or less than under pure emissions trading or a pure emissions tax, under the assumption that uncertainty about aggregate marginal abatement costs is symmetric the most likely... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emissions Taxes; Emissions Trading; Uncertainty; Safety Valve; Hybrid Emissions Control; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; Q28. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53125 Should we impose emissions taxes that firms evade? AgEcon Stranlund, John K.. Most of the theoretical literature on enforcing environmental policies focuses on situations in which pollution sources are noncompliant. However, some recent work suggests that these situations will very often involve suboptimal policy designs. Thus, the circumstances under which it is efficient to implement policies that do not motivate full compliance appear to be more limited than most of the literature would imply. In this paper, I identify several circumstances under which regulators may conserve enforcement costs by implementing emissions taxes that firms evade. I demonstrate that a regulator can use a firm’s tax evasion to reduce monitoring effort, but only if its monitoring strategy can be made an increasing function of the firm’s emissions, if... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Sanctions; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; L51; Q58. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93967 Bankruptcy Risk and Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Zhang, Wei. Under favorable but reasonable conditions, an imperfectly enforced emissions tax produces the efficient allocation of individual emissions control; aggregate emissions are independent of whether enforcement of the tax is sufficient to induce the full compliance of firms, and differences in individual violations are independent of firm-level differences. All of these desirable characteristics disappear when some firms under an emissions tax risk bankruptcy—the allocation of emissions control is inefficient, imperfect enforcement causes higher aggregate emissions, and financially insecure firms choose higher violations. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Bankruptcy; Emissions Taxes; Limited Liability; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; Q28; Q58. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42127 The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Chavez, Carlos A.; Villena, Mauricio G.. We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly distributed... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Asymmetric Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7387 Who Should Bear the Administrative Costs of an Emissions Tax? AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Chavez, Carlos A.. All environmental policies involve administrative costs, the costs of implementing and managing policies that extend beyond abatement costs. We examine theoretically the optimal distribution of these costs between the public and regulated sources of pollution. The distribution of administrative costs affects social welfare only if public funds are more expensive than private funds, or if the distribution of administrative costs affects the size of a regulated industry. If having the public take on a larger part of administrative costs increases the size of the industry and this does not lead to lower emissions for a given emissions tax, then it is optimal to make the pollution sources bear all of the administrative costs. A necessary, but not sufficient,... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emissions Taxes; Pigouvian Taxes; Administrative Costs; Pollution Control; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; L51; Q58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102266 Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco