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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Ecology and Society (1) Autor Petrick, Martin (2) Acheson, James; Department of Anthropology and School of Marine Sciences, University of Maine; acheson@maine.edu (1) Bullock, David S. (1) Gardner, Roy; Department of Economics, Indiana University; gardner@indiana.edu (1) Mittenzwei, Klaus (1) Palavra-chave Evolutionary game theory (4) C73 (3) Collective action (2) Community/Rural/Urban Development (2) Neo-endogenous policies (2) R23 (2) R58 (2) Rural governance (2) Agricultural and Food Policy (1) Agricultural policy (1) Collective action. (1) D72 (1) Lobster (1) Maine (1) Prisoner's dilemma (1) Q18 (1) V-notch program (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (3) Peer-Reviewed Reports (1) Ano 2011 (2) 2010 (1) 2005 (1) País United States (3) Canada (1) Idioma Inglês (4)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última The Evolution of the Maine Lobster V-Notch Practice: Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game Ecology and Society Acheson, James; Department of Anthropology and School of Marine Sciences, University of Maine; acheson@maine.edu; Gardner, Roy; Department of Economics, Indiana University; gardner@indiana.edu. Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Reports Palavras-chave: Collective action; Evolutionary game theory; Lobster; Maine; Prisoner's dilemma; V-notch program. Ano: 2011 Halting the Rural Race to the Bottom: An Evolutionary Model of Rural Development to Analyse Neo-endogenous Policies in the EU AgEcon Petrick, Martin. The article contributes to the understanding of neo-endogenous rural development policies from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Rural development is modelled as the increasing realisation over time of gains from interaction by rural stakeholders. The model exhibits two dynamically stable equilibria, which depict declining and prospering regions. Neo-endogenous policies are interpreted as stimuli emerging from an external government authority which help decentralised actors to coordinate on the superior of the two equilibria. External intervention may thus be possible and desirable without giving up the autonomy of local decision makers. However, because initial conditions matter, outcomes cannot be planned or engineered from the outside. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Rural governance; Neo-endogenous policies; Evolutionary game theory; Collective action.; Community/Rural/Urban Development; C73; R23; R58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114764 Halting the rural race to the bottom: an evolutionary model of rural development to analyse neo-endogenous policies in the EU AgEcon Petrick, Martin. The article contributes to the understanding of neo-endogenous rural development policies from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Rural development is modelled as the increasing realisation over time of gains from interaction by rural stakeholders. The model exhibits two dynamically stable equilibria, which depict declining and prospering regions. Neo-endogenous policies are interpreted as stimuli emerging from an external government authority which help decentralised actors to coordinate on the superior of the two equilibria. External intervention may thus be possible and desirable without giving up the autonomy of local decision makers. However, because initial conditions matter, outcomes cannot be planned or engineered from the outside. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Rural governance; Neo-endogenous policies; Evolutionary game theory; Collective action; Community/Rural/Urban Development; C73; R23; R58. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94897 Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Examine U.S. and EU Agricultural Policy Institutions AgEcon Bullock, David S.; Mittenzwei, Klaus. A brief review of the history of agricultural policymaking in Europe and the U.S. reveals that major policy changes have often been brought about by major socio-political "shocks," such as the Great Depression and World War II. Such shocks also lead to the creation of institutions that tend to stay in place for long periods after the initial shock has passed. We use evolutionary game theory to model and simulate the effects of socio-political shocks on political institutions. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agricultural policy; Evolutionary game theory; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q18; D72; C73. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24538 Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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