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| Valsecchi, Irene. |
| The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent, and the non-expert, who is either a decision-maker or an evaluator of the expert’s performance. According to the Bayesian decision-theoretic approach the expert is the agent who announces his probabilistic opinion, and the non-expert has to incorporate that opinion into his beliefs in a consistent way, despite his poor understanding of the expert’s substantive knowledge. The two approaches ground the relationships between experts and non-experts on such different... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Expert; Information Transmission; Learning; D81; L21. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36756 |
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| Hlavsa, Tomas. |
| Composite indicators are useful as tool for complex evaluation and aggregation of different variables of regional development. Variables which are aggregated in a composite indicator have first to be weighted. All variables may be given equal weights or they mea be given differing weights which reflect the significance, reliability or other characteristics of the underlying data. The weights given to different variables heavily influence the outcomes of the composite indicator. Aim of this paper is an evaluation of selected methods for weighting of particular variables in frame of composite indicator construction. Evaluation is verified on group of regional economic variables based on Strategy of regional development. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Composite indicator; Region; Principal component analysis; Expert; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; GA; IN. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99082 |
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| Valsecchi, Irene. |
| Two agents are engaged in a joint activity that yields a common perperiod payoff at two rounds of play. The expert announces the probability that the current state of the world is low, instead of high, at each stage. Having received the report of the expert, the decision-maker takes action at every period according to his posterior beliefs. At the end of each round of play, the true current state is verifiable. The distinctive assumption of the paper is that the decision-maker makes a subjective appraisal of the expert’s reliability: he considers the expert’s true forecasts as the outcomes of an experiment of unknown statistical bias. The paper shows that the expert will have instrumental reputational concerns, related to the future estimate of the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Opinion; Expert; Strategic Communication; Financial Economics; D81; D84. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98437 |
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| Kovacs, Janos. |
| A társadalom helyzete gazdasági teljesítőképességén nyugszik. Ezért olyan érdekrendszer szükséges, amely minden szinten – állami irányítás, intézmény, egyén, gazdasági, társadalmi szervezetek stb. – megkívánja a konstruktív hozzáállást. Kitől várhatja az agrártársadalom a megváltó ötleteket, ha nem az egyetemektől? Ahhoz viszont, hogy a szakemberek meg tudjanak felelni a holnap elvárásainak, az egyetemi képzést már ma korszerűsíteni, nemzetközi színvonalúvá szükséges tenni. A tényleges társadalmi igényeknek megfelelő szakember-kibocsátó kapacitás és a hatékonyságot szolgáló intézményi szerkezet kialakítása indokolt. Természetesen folytatható az elnapolási gyakorlat is, csakhogy a jelen tevékenysége adottságként jelentkezik már a közeljövőben. Nem... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agrárszféra; Felsőoktatás; Gazdaság; Társadalom; Szakember; Agricultural sphere; Higher education; Economy; Society; Expert; Labor and Human Capital; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58596 |
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| Valsecchi, Irene. |
| The paper is concerned with the interaction between two agents: an expert, announcing his probability that a particular state of the world will occur, and a non-expert decision-maker, who takes action according to his posterior beliefs. The decision-maker considers the expert an experiment of uncertain reliability and takes the received messages as the outcomes of such an experiment. The model of the expert in the decision-makers mind bears no relation with any measure of the experts actual information. The paper shows that messages will be biased, notwithstanding solidarity between the agents. However, the longer the interaction, the less severe will be the bias. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Opinion; Expert; Instructions; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D81; L21. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8647 |
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