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Registros recuperados: 5
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Profit Sharing under the Threat of Nationalization AgEcon
Di Corato, Luca.
A multinational corporation engages in foreign direct investment for the extraction of a natural resource in a developing country. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share of the profits. The host country provides access and guarantees conditions of operation. Since the investment is totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty in market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework, where the government holds an American call option on nationalization, we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining leads to a profit distribution maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment threshold...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Real Options; Nash Bargaining; Expropriation; Natural Resources; Foreign Direct Investment; International Relations/Trade; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C7; D8; K3; F2; O1.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58292
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Police-powers, regulatory takings and the efficient compensation of domestic and foreign investors AgEcon
Aisbett, Emma; Karp, Larry S.; McAusland, Carol.
In customary international and public law, “takings” resulting from regulations designed to protect the public good are generally excluded from compensation rules; this exclusion is known as a police powers carve-out (PPCO). Increasingly, this PPCO is being challenged, particularly in international investment law. This paper analyzes the efficiency properties of a PPCO in a model with endogenous regulation, investment and entry. We design a one-parameter family of carve-out/compensation schemes that induce efficient regulation and firm level investment even when the regulator suffers fiscal illusion and the social benefit from regulation is private information to the regulator. We show that offering a carve-out reduces the subsidy to risky industry...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulatory takings; Expropriation; Environment; Foreign direct investment; NAFTA; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; F21; H4; K3; Q58.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42842
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Price or politics? An investigation of the causes of expropriation AgEcon
Duncan, Roderick.
Expropriations of foreign direct investment in developing countries are typically blamed on political and economic crises in those countries. Developing a new database of expropriations in the minerals sectors of developing country exporters, I show that expropriations were correlated with mineral price booms and that democratic governments were more likely to expropriate. No link is found between expropriations and political or economic crises, except at independence. A better explanation of expropriation would be opportunistic behaviour by host governments when profits of investments are high. In two developed countries, Australia and Canada, expropriations are also found to occur during price booms.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Expropriation; Foreign direct investment; Natural resources; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116859
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Profit Sharing under the Threat of Nationalization AgEcon
Di Corato, Luca.
A government bargains a mutually convenient agreement with a multinational corporation to extract a natural resource. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share on the profits. The host country provides access and guarantee conditions of operation. Being the investment totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty on market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework where the government holds an American call option on nationalization we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining is feasible and leads to attain a cooperative agreement maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment time...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Real Options; Nash Bargaining; Expropriation; Natural Resources; Foreign Direct Investment; Financial Economics; C7; D8; K3; F2; O1.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59378
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Regulatory Takings and Environmental Regulation in NAFTA's Chapter 11 AgEcon
Aisbett, Emma; Karp, Larry S.; McAusland, Carol.
NAFTA's investment treaty has led to several expropriation compensation claims from investors hurt by new environmental regulations. Expropriation clauses in international treaties solve post-investment moral hazard problems such as hold-ups. However, these clauses can interact with National Treatment clauses in a manner that hinders investment. A police powers carve-out from the definition of expropriation can be Pareto-improving and can increase the level of foreign investment.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Foreign direct investment; Regulatory takings; Expropriation; NAFTA; National Treatment; Environment; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; K3; Q58; F21.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7195
Registros recuperados: 5
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