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What do people bring into the game : experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons AgEcon
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo; Ostrom, Elinor.
The study of collective action requires an understanding of the individual incentives and of the institutional constraints that guide people in making choices about cooperating or defecting on the group facing the dilemma. The use of local ecosystems by groups of individuals is just one example where individual extraction increases well-being, but aggregate extraction decreases it. The use of economic experiments has enhanced the already diverse knowledge from theoretical and field sources of when and how groups can solve the problem through self-governing mechanisms. These studies have identified several factors that promote and limit collective action, associated with the nature of the production system that allows groups to benefit from a joint-access...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Collective Action; Cooperation; Field Experiments; Local Ecosystems; Experimental Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51816
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Collective Action for Watershed Management: Field Experiments in Colombia and Kenya AgEcon
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo; Rodriguez, Luz Angela; Johnson, Nancy L..
The dilemma of collective action around water use and management involves solving both the problems of provision and appropriation. Cooperation in the provision can be affected by the rival nature of the appropriation and the asymmetries in the access. We report two field experiments conducted in Colombia and Kenya. The Irrigation Game was used to explore the provision and appropriation decisions under asymmetric or sequential appropriation, complemented with a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism experiment which looks at provision decisions under symmetric appropriation. The overall results were consistent with the patterns of previous studies: the zero contribution hypotheses is rejected whereas the most effective institution to increase cooperation was...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Collective Action; Watersheds; Field Experiments; Colombia; Kenya; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Q0; Q2; C9; H3; H4.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91169
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