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SAFEX maize price volatility scrutinised AgEcon
Geyser, Mariette; Cutts, Michela.
Commodity prices in general are known to have a high volatility. This is in fact what attracts speculators. The South African futures exchange (SAFEX) is not immune to this volatility. Volatility increases the risk of paying higher prices for a specific commodity, and it also makes the use of derivative instruments to hedge against price risk more expensive. Given the importance of South Africa as a regional supplier of maize and price discovery mechanism, investigations into the volatility of the maize price are not only important, but also indispensable if all parties involved are to manage this risk. The question therefore is whether the SAFEX maize price volatility can be explained by using fundamental factors or whether this volatility is...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Derivative; Price volatility; Call option; Hedging; Food risk; SAFEX; CBOT; Demand and Price Analysis.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8009
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A model-based approach to moral hazard in food chains - What contribution do principal-agent-models make to the understanding of food risks induced by opportunistic behaviour? AgEcon
Hirschauer, Norbert.
Food risks may be caused by moral hazard, i.e. by opportunistic behaviour of upstream sellers who exploit the fact that many food product qualities remain uncertain to downstream buyers in the course of conventional market transactions (credence qualities). Due to this lack of market transparency buyers run the risk to pay premium prices for inferior products (quality risks); furthermore, they run the risk to use or consume substances which are harmful (health risks). Therefore, they will want to design optimal contracts and controls preventing opportunistic behaviour. Usually, however, buyers cannot contract contingent on the actions of upstream sellers because they cannot observe them directly (information asymmetry). Motivated by the obviously...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Food risk; Information asymmetry; Moral hazard; Opportunistic behaviour; Prevention; Principal-agent-model; Traceability; Agribusiness; Farm Management; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97448
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